



Women Talking Politics

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Cover image: A picture of a typically busy intersection near downtown Auckland during the 2020 Level 4 lockdown. Used with permission; credit, and thanks to Sarah Bickerton at the University of Auckland.

From the Editors

Dr Lara Greaves & Professor Jennifer Curtin

E ngā mana, e ngā reo, e ngā karangatanga maha, tēnā koutou katoa.

A lot has happened since we signed on to be editors of the 2020 issue of Women Talking Politics. 2020 was a challenging year for us, and likely for the majority of women working in the political studies space. Many balanced work and whānau commitments alongside the pandemic and its associated challenges.

You may have noticed that this edition covers both 2020-2021. This decision was made for numerous reasons, not least because of the added pressures on women academics over this time period. Thus, some of the pieces included here were submitted during 2020: the order of each section of the issue begins with those submitted earlier and ends with those submitted later. Some of the authors opted to update their work for late 2021, whereas others did not - leaving the work as a time capsule of sorts.

Our peer-reviewed section contains seven articles authored by early, mid-career, and senior women scholars from around Aotearoa New Zealand. Several speak to themes of crisis, change and leadership in what has become a challenging international context, for international relations, and in terms of the pandemic. Others address questions of what is required to advance diverse and effective representation for Māori and migrant women, descriptively, substantively, and symbolically.

Manqing Cheng discusses the ways in which COVID-19 has increased the potential for backsliding on globalisation and multilateralism; through increased protectionism, rising populism, and a potential for focusing increasingly on traditional economic issues pushing aside pressing non-traditional security issues. Mengdi Zhang's paper also examines an element of international relations, specifically political implications, and diplomatic dimensions of China's request for extradition of Kyung Yup Kim, a Korean-born New Zealand permanent resident. Regional politics is a feature of Gay Francisco's analysis of the leadership and rhetoric of two starkly different leaders, Jacinda Ardern and President Rodrigo Duterte, during their respective COVID-19 lockdown responses in 2020. Heather Devere also explores the power of language through her analysis of the concepts of kindness, compassion and peace, and the extent to which Ardern's political rhetoric can connect these concepts in a meaningful way.

Two essays discuss findings from their respective pilot projects on the experiences of migrant and ethnic women in politics and during the pandemic. Rachel Simon-Kumar and Priya Kurian examine the continuing barriers to participating in the formal political arena, and the challenges associated with an adversarial Westminster system where ethnic women politicians often experience their roles as marginalised among minorities. The essay reports on a series of discussions with ethnic women candidates whose personalised experiences of this marginalisation highlight how much more work is required for our polity to be wholly inclusive. Meanwhile Barbara Bedeschi-Lewando, Gauri Nandedkar, Sylvia Lima, Shirin Brown, Ema Tagicakibau, Ann Afadama and Randolph Hollingsworth describe early findings of their research into the socio-economic and political implications of COVID-19 on migrant and ethnic women in Aotearoa. The voices of the women reported in this essay reveal both hardship and strength in response to the range of challenges

that resulted from the pandemic and the associated lockdowns. Jemma Greenhill's insightful contribution reminds us that 'feminism' as a concept and a practice is not interchangeable between culture, providing a timely analysis of the way that Mana Wahine can be an important tool in decolonising Western feminism while also revealing disparities between Māori and Pākehā. Finally, the issue contains Hanna Thompson's essay on pay disparity for Māori nurses from a Mana Wahine lens. Thompson's essay won the 2020 NZPSA undergraduate prize in Māori politics.

The issue also contains a range of research briefs authored by women political studies scholars, emerging and established. Heather Tribe reflects on the changes to her PhD given travel restrictions, to instead focus on the gendered impacts of disasters in Aotearoa. Peyton Bond describes her PhD project on the workplace experiences of indoor sex workers in Aotearoa, discusses the coding and analysis process, and the challenges that sex workers face. Lydia Le Gros discusses her masters research on the language of New Zealand's counter-terrorism discourse. Danella Glass, a new PhD student at Otago, discusses her upcoming work on the continuing conflict between two rival transnational normative communities in the area of sexual and reproductive rights. Oluwakemi Igiebor discusses her recently completed PhD research on a feminist institutionalist approach to academic institutions in Nigeria. Nashie Shamoon provides an overview of her Masters work on the identity of young Assyrian New Zealanders and Australians, and their connections to historical struggle and persecution. Lastly, Rose Cole describes an overview and her approach to her thesis on the role of private secretaries in minister's offices in New Zealand. We can be assured that despite the challenges of the pandemic, the future of women's political studies' contributions is very bright!

Alongside this, a number of women political science academics authored and edited books during the pandemic, and progressed funded projects; a small fraction of whom discuss their work here. Lara Greaves, Janine Hayward, and Claire Timperley who describe the journey to publish *Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand* while Maria Armoudian describes her book, *Lawyers Beyond Borders*, which explores the ways in which lawyers have advanced human rights abuse cases through international courts. Priya Kurian describes her two-year project with colleagues on the perspectives of Māori and non-Māori on gene-editing technologies, an increasingly important policy issue.

Two emerging scholars discuss their innovative current research projects. We hear from recent MBIE Te Whitinga post-doctoral fellowship recipient Sylvia Frain, who describes her upcoming work with Fiona Amundsen on the legacies of nuclear imperialisms across Oceania. Mona Krewel describes the New Zealand Social Media study, which started across the 2020 General Election and provides a great base for ongoing work monitoring the social media communications of politicians and parties in Aotearoa.

The issue also contains a stimulating and timely creative piece. Shirin Brown provides an excerpt from her script *The Me Not Movement* from the Short and Sweet Theatre Festival 2019. Brown's spirited script touches on many pertinent themes for the current times including reproductive rights, the climate, and inequality.

Finally, the issue contains two book reviews. A review from Esme Hall covers Coleman's *From Suffrage to a Seat in the House: A Path to Parliament for New Zealand Women* (Otago University Press). Esme provides a detailed overview of the events, debates, and perspectives covered in the book, and some of its limitations. Lara Greaves provides a light-hearted review of Hill's *Taking the Lead: How Jacinda Wowed the World* (Picture Puffin), a beautifully illustrated children's book which covers Ardern's life and early years as Prime Minister.

The editors would like to acknowledge the generous support and help of the New Zealand Political Studies Association (NZPSA) Te Kāhui Tātai Tōrangapū o Aotearoa, including President Patrick Barrett, Executive Secretary Peter Skilling, and Treasurer Jack Vowles. We would like to thank the immediate past editor, Sarah

Bickerton for her assistance, and our cover image. Our thanks also go to our research assistant Frank Gore for his help with proofreading and formatting, and to our colleagues who took the time to review the articles included here.

Lastly, we would also like to thank the contributors for their excellent pieces and efforts in trying times. We are pleased to have brought together a collection of pieces that are diverse in career stage and areas of the discipline.

Ngā mihi ki ngā kaituhi me kaipānui o Women Talking Politics,

Dr Lara Greaves and Professor Jennifer Curtin

University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

Contributors

Ann Afadama holds a master of arts degree in History and International Studies and is currently a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, University of Waikato. Her research is on disability and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.

Fiona Amundsen is an Associate Professor in the School of Art and Design at Auckland University of Technology. Her work explores photographic and filmic images and historical trauma, and she works with military produced archival imagery and witness testimonies.

Maria Armoudian is a senior lecturer at the University of Auckland in New Zealand, the host and producer of the radio program, The Scholars' Circle, and the author of three books: *Lawyers Beyond Borders: Advancing International Human Rights through Local Laws and Courts*; *Kill the Messenger: The Media's Role in the Fate of the World*; and *Reporting from the Danger Zone: Frontline Journalists, Their Jobs and an Increasingly Perilous Future*. She has published widely on human rights, environmental politics, communication, and good governance.

Barbara Bedeschi-Lewando is an international development practitioner specialising in climate change, disaster resilience, and human rights. She is a PhD candidate at Victoria University of Wellington researching innovation policy for transformation and the Sustainable Development Goals.

Peyton Bond is a PhD candidate in the Gender Studies department at the University of Otago. Her research focuses on the workplace experiences of indoor sex workers in Aotearoa New Zealand using feminist methodologies and frameworks.

Shirin Brown's research for a PhD at Auckland University of Technology on local government focuses on the experience of local board members at the Auckland Council. She has lectured and taught in film, intercultural communication and the English language. Ideally, she would like to focus more on writing and directing plays and films.

Manqing Cheng is a Doctoral Researcher in Politics and International Relations at the University of Auckland, a former visiting researcher with the New Zealand Centre at Peking University, has a Masters in International Affairs from Pennsylvania State University. She is also a former security expert at an American think tank in Washington, D.C., a former economic affairs researcher at United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), in Bangkok, Thailand.

Rose Cole is a PhD candidate at the Victoria University of Wellington School of Government, and has worked in a variety of roles in the public service including Private Secretary for seven government ministers across the political spectrum.

Jennifer Curtin is a Professor of Politics and Director of the Public Policy Institute at Waipapa Taumata Rau, the University of Auckland. She is an expert on gender politics and policy, as well as Australian and Aotearoa New Zealand politics and elections.

Heather Devere has a doctorate from the University of Auckland in Politics and has been working for the past eleven years at the University of Otago as Director of Practice of the Te Ao o Rongomaraeroa/National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. Her research includes indigenous peace traditions, the politics of friendship, media, ethics, and gender studies.

Sylvia Frain was awarded the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Science Whitinga Fellowship created to support early career researchers in August 2021. Dr Frain will begin the two-year fellowship under the supervision of Dr Fiona Amundsen in the School of Art + Design at Auckland University of Technology in January 2022.

Gay Marie Manalo Francisco is a doctoral candidate in Politics and International Relations at the University of Auckland. Her thesis topic is about the influence of political dynasties on women's rights policymaking in the Philippines.

Danella Glass is a PhD candidate at the University of Otago. She graduated from the Victoria University of Wellington with a Master of International Relations with distinction in 2020. Her current research applies a social constructivist approach to women's rights and sexual and reproductive health.

Lara Greaves (Ngāpuhi, Pākehā, Tararā) is a senior lecturer in New Zealand politics and public policy and Associate Director (Policy Inc) of the Public Policy Institute at the University of Auckland. Her current research spans Māori and New Zealand politics, survey methods, sexuality and gender, Māori identity, and hauora/health.

Jemma Greenhill (she/her) is in her third year of studying a conjoint degree of a Bachelor of Laws and a Bachelor of Arts, majoring in Philosophy and Māori Resource Management.

Esme Hall is a researcher/analyst at the Waitangi Tribunal. She graduated from the University of Otago with a Master of Politics with distinction in 2020.

Janine Hayward is a professor of politics at the University of Otago. She has (co)-edited the last two editions of the New Zealand Government and Politics textbook. She contributes to the New Zealand Election Study project and regularly advises local governments on electoral systems and representation review requirements. Her research engages with te Tiriti o Waitangi, as well as constitutional and electoral politics.

Randolph Hollingsworth received her PhD from the University of Kentucky in 1999. She is an advocate for innovative and creative ways to learn.

Oluwakemi Igiebor is a final year PhD student in Politics and International Relations at the University of Auckland. She works as a Research Fellow at the University's Public Policy Institute. Her research interests include gender equity policies, feminist institutional analysis, higher education administration and leadership, and public policy analysis.

Mona Krewel is a lecturer in comparative politics with a specialization in the study of elections, political parties, and public opinion at the Victoria University of Wellington, as well as an External Fellow of the Mannheim Center for European Social Research (MZES) at the University of Mannheim. Dr Krewel's research

focuses on the relation between media and politics and in particular on the role of the media in election campaigns.

Priya Kurian is professor of political science and public policy at the University of Waikato. Her research examines critical questions of gender, culture, race and class in the quest for environmental, social and political sustainability. Her current research is in the areas of climate politics and policy, ethnic women and politics, and the governance of new technologies, such as gene editing.

Lydia Le Gros is a Master's student at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Otago. Her current research interests include feminist IR, gender and security, terrorism and New Zealand politics.

Sylvia Lima is a PhD candidate at Victoria University of Wellington. Her research focuses on climate change adaptation in the coastal zones of developing countries financed through multilateral organizations.

Gauri Nandedkar is a researcher in the Affordable Housing for Generations team in the National Science Challenge's Building Better Homes Towns and Cities. Her research concentrates on critical policy studies and the hidden politics of power in policy planning.

Nashie Shamoon has recently completed her Master of Arts in Political Science at Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington. Her research interests include Middle East politics, ethno-religious diasporas, Syrian refugee communities based in the Middle East, refugee-background communities in New Zealand, and ethnic minority representation in politics.

Rachel Simon-Kumar is an Associate Professor in the School of Population Health, the University of Auckland. She co-leads the 'Ethnic Women in Politics' project, funded by a Marsden Grant, which runs from 2020 to 2023.

Emma Tagicakibau received her PhD from the University of Auckland in 2013. She is a gender analyst and human rights trainer at ET Consultancy.

Hanna Thompson is in her third year of study for a Bachelor of Laws and Bachelor of Arts conjoint, majoring in Politics and International Relations and Sociology.

Claire Timperley is a lecturer in Political Science at Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington. Her teaching and research interests include feminist political theory, gender politics, critical pedagogy, and the politics of Aotearoa New Zealand.

Heather Tribe is a PhD candidate at the University of Otago, researching the intersections of gender and disasters in Aotearoa New Zealand. Her research interests include gender, disaster and societal vulnerability, food insecurity, and central governments' climate and environmental resilience strategies.

Mengdi Zhang is a PhD candidate in International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington. She is a part-time analyst at the Xiamen University New Zealand Research Centre (China). Her current PhD thesis researches the oscillating economic-security nexus in New Zealand's relations with China.

Articles

Kindness and COVID: Towards Positive Peace

Heather Devere

'Be kind' has been one of the slogans of the campaign to manage the COVID-19 outbreaks in Aotearoa New Zealand. The message came initially from our Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, as a seemingly genuine and wise encouragement to our 'team of five million'. There are posters around our cities, and lit up signs on our motorways reminding us to 'Be Kind'. This promotion of kindness over aggressiveness is one of the distinguishing features of Ardern's leadership (see for example Burrows, 2020 and Howie, 2020).

Kindness is one of many aspects of relationships that are needed for positive peace. Positive peace is a condition of society where conflict can be dealt with non-violently, where social justice is in evidence, where there is environmental sustainability, and where relationships are positive (Standish et al., 2021).

The theory that positive relationships enhance peace was first put forward by Jane Addams in 1907 and described as a 'feminism that is derived from female experience, and starts with relationships in the home and neighbourhood, eventually being extended outward to incorporate nations' (Shields & Soeters, 2017). However, there has been little written about what are these 'positive relationships' that might be required for positive peace.

In an article for *Infactis Pax: Journal of Peace Education and Social Justice*, I identified 34 concepts or values within relationships that might contribute towards positive peace, and I categorised these into four types of relationships: those based on emotion, those based on cognitive awareness or insight, those based on social conscience and those based on trust. As with most attempts at categorisation there are overlaps and this is not a definitive classification. Other concepts or values can be added to this table.

The Bases for Relationships for Positive Peace

Emotion	Cognitive Awareness and Insight	Social Conscience	Trust
Love	Respect	Justice	Honesty
Affection	Tolerance	Equality	Openness
Kindheartedness	Acceptance	Fairness	Sincerity
Compassion	Empathy	Ethics	Genuineness
	Concern	Rightness	Integrity
	Care	Helpfulness	Trustworthiness
	Friendship	Generosity	Reliability
	Cooperation	Hospitality	Confidence
	Harmony	Empowerment	Confianza
	Peacefulness	Allyship	
	Forgiveness		

(Source: Devere, 2018 p.62)

I present this here to help to show that while kindness is vital for positive peace, it is not enough, and also to demonstrate the complexities involved in just understanding what sorts of relationships can help to create positive peace.

But what is involved in being kind, and what is needed in relationships in addition to kindness? Kindheartedness is an emotional response that comes unbidden from someone's innate character. It is also an emotional reaction that can be fostered or manipulated. Each value needs to be reinforced by others in order to work in favour of positive peace. Kindness is close to 'compassion' and 'sympathy', with the root meaning 'to suffer with' but can be interpreted as pity and carries connotations of condescension. Empathy, a more 'modern' term, embodies 'feeling along with', requiring a cognitive understanding of the difficulties experienced by the other person or group. Showing kindness can be equated with 'concern' usually voiced, whereas 'care' involves actions such as looking after, protecting, watching over and providing sustenance. This does not require an emotional attachment, but it needs to be accompanied by 'respect', a cognitive response in recognition of other people. Trust is enhanced if there is also 'sincerity', 'genuineness' and 'honesty'. Support can be given in friendship, which is intrinsically a two-way relationship that is based on some kind of reciprocity. Allyship, on the other hand, is a consciousness that the privileged should walk alongside, but be prepared to be in the background and not the main focus. Kindness is never enough if there is injustice and inequality in a society.

Each type of relationship also has shortcomings, especially if used on their own. We can learn to control our emotions, but this is not always successful and we are often controlled by our emotions that are instinctual or

intuitive feelings. Relationships based on cognitive awareness are seen as rational, considered and can be altruistic, but can also be viewed as instrumental and not genuine. Relationships based on social consciousness include an awareness of the problems, a concern for those affected, responsibility accepted for injustices, and a conscious effort to do something about this. The most demanding relationships mean that people often fall short. Engendering trust is constant and long term. Relationships based on trust cannot survive too much secrecy. Trust takes time to build up, but it can very easily be extinguished.

We have benefited from having Jacinda Ardern as a leader at this watershed time in our history. She has demonstrated during the lockdown a number of these values that are helpful for maintaining peace. Her kindness seems genuine as shown previously to be a natural reaction immediately after the Christchurch shootings. She demonstrates insight to advocate for respect and cooperation as a reasonable and thoughtful response to a situation. Yes, kindness is not enough, and Jacinda is far from perfect. But if the intention is to build trust in each other, to work collaboratively, to be aware of the needs of others, to offset angry and hostile reactions, to allow for disagreement, to deflect wrath, then kindness is a good start, and certainly less likely than aggression, to enable positive peace to be attained in Aotearoa.

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Defining the Lockdown: The Rhetoric of New Zealand's Jacinda Ardern and Philippines' Rodrigo Duterte

Gay Marie Francisco

In 2020, the Philippines and New Zealand implemented strict lockdown measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte placed Metro Manila and selected provinces under Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) from 15 March to 14 April¹, while New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern announced the country's move to alert level 4 from 25 March lasting until 27 April. While both countries used different terminologies and had differences in actual implementation, both ECQ and Level 4 effectively mean placing specified areas under lockdown, requiring residents to stay at home, and allowing them to access only essential services. This article used qualitative content analysis to examine the 2020 lockdown announcement speeches of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, applying the work of Zarefsky (2004) on Presidential Definition. The article asks the questions: (1) How did the two leaders define the concept of lockdown as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic? (2) Are there similarities and differences in their definition of the concept?

Gender, Rhetoric, and the Power of Definition

Studies show that women and men politicians differ in their rhetoric. There are a number of studies comparing the discourse in the campaign strategies of aspirants Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US presidential election (Enli, 2017; Lakoff, 2017; Liu & Lei, 2018; Savoy, 2018). Studies find that Trump used a more negative tone in his speeches than Clinton (Liu & Lei, 2018; Savoy, 2018). In a study comparing Donald Trump and Jacinda Ardern's portrayal of Muslim minorities in relation to the 2019 Christchurch Mosque shooting incident, findings reveal Trump's anti-Muslim sentiments and Ardern's inclusive stance, which does not conform to stereotypes (Jalalian Daghig & Rahim, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic showed how leaders' responses are gendered, with women leaders demonstrating "protective femininity," which has been gaining positive coverage from the media (Johnson & Williams, 2020, p. 4).

Duterte has been referred to as a populist, "foul-mouthed Filipino leader" (Heydarian, 2017, p. 220) whose campaign speeches were "peppered with swearing and sexist remarks" (Curato, 2017, p. 147). While *Time* included Duterte in their list of strongmen leaders², Ardern's *Time* feature article labelled her "a rookie...whose platform was built on kindness, acceptance and inclusion" (Luscombe, 2020). This article explores how these two leaders defined the lockdown, an extreme form of restriction of people's activities, as their government's response to the pandemic. Given the small number of women leaders, few studies look at the gendered dimensions of rhetoric, particularly how leaders define a similar policy response. This article

¹ Extended to 30 April through a Memorandum from the Office of the President dated 7 April 2020 upon the recommendation of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Emerging Infectious Diseases (IATF).

² In the feature article, Duterte was lined up with US President Donald Trump, President of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Bremmer, 2018).

aims to contribute to this body of literature as it participates in the discussion of policy communication in response to a global health crisis.

The work of Zarefsky (2004) provides an ideal framework for this analysis. The work proposes that position and resources enable the president to provide a definition that “might be able to shape the context in which events or proposals are viewed by the public” (p. 611). Hence, how presidents or top leaders define situations has the power to influence public opinion and policy decisions. Zarefsky lists four approaches of rhetorical definition: (1) By “association” or linking together of different concepts; (2) By dissociation or “breaking a concept into parts in order to identify one’s proposal with the more favoured part”; (3) Using “*condensation symbols*” or combining various ideas and perceptions to simplify the situation and minimise ambiguity; and (4) “frame shifting” or providing a different perspective of a concept or situation from how it was generally perceived (p. 612-613). Zarefsky explains that the list is not exhaustive, but it is useful for this comparative analysis to help identify the points where definitions converge and differ. The following discusses how Ardern and Duterte used these four approaches in defining the 2020 lockdown.

Association: Emergency and Crisis

Ardern referred to the pandemic as an emergency that requires immediate action: “Act now, or risk the virus taking hold as it has elsewhere” (*Prime Minister: COVID-19 Alert Level increased*, 2020). For his part, Duterte linked the COVID-19 pandemic to the term ‘crisis,’ reiterating that the virus has no cure and no vaccine is available. These concept associations were necessary to frame the lockdown as the best course of action. Ardern explained that it is necessary to take advantage of “the window of opportunity” to stop the spread of the virus in the community. Duterte urged the people to keep a healthy lifestyle to protect themselves from the virus but emphasised the importance of following the rules: “But most of all, try to obey what government is suggesting or ordering you to do” (*Public Address of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte on the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)*, 2020).

Dissociation: Duterte says lockdown is not martial law

Ardern did not use the “dissociation” approach to define the lockdown, while Duterte repeatedly mentioned that the lockdown is not martial law. The term martial law had gained a negative connotation in the Philippines because of the history of abuse of power during the administration of former president Ferdinand Marcos when the military and police were given the authority to arrest and detain civilians without due process (Schulzke, 2010). While lockdown measures have similarities with martial law in terms of restricting people’s movements, Duterte explained that its aim is to protect people’s lives and not impinge upon people’s civil liberties. He even mentioned his reluctance to use ‘lockdown’ because some relate it to a power struggle. He stated: “There is no struggle of power here... It’s just a matter of protecting and defending you from COVID-19. That’s about it. It has nothing to do with the power of the military or the power of the police, nor or my power” (*Public Address of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte on the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)*, 2020).

Condensation Symbols: We don’t want to be like Italy

Both leaders used Italy’s case as an example of a situation that has become difficult to manage. Italy as a condensation symbol allowed them to make a case about how strict lockdown measures are necessary to avoid being in the same position as a country with an overwhelmed health system and rising death toll. The two leaders also presented the lockdown as a symbol of united action which they claim is the best way to face the

pandemic. Ardern used the term “working together” while Duterte used the word “cooperation,” with both referring to how people should abide by the rules during the lockdown.

Ardern used condensation symbols more than Duterte. She defined the lockdown as a “simple” plan: “We can stop the spread by staying at home and reducing contact” (*Prime Minister: COVID-19 Alert Level increased*, 2020). Although she briefly mentioned the economic consequences of the lockdown, condensing the concept into a “simple plan” provided the public with a one-sentence instruction on what they needed to do. In addition, the Prime Minister also discussed the “worst-case scenario”: “It would represent the greatest loss of New Zealanders’ lives in our country’s history.” This condensation symbol presents the lockdown measure as the most humane response. It presents Ardern’s government as one that cares for people’s lives more than the economy—an issue that lockdown critics continue to raise.

Frame Shifting: Ardern Focuses on what People can do; Duterte’s Positive Spin on China

While describing the lockdown as “the most significant restriction on New Zealanders’ movements in modern history,” Ardern devoted time to describe what people can do, such as leaving home for exercise and leisure while observing social distancing guidelines. This frame shifting approach provided a different picture of the concept of lockdown, which generally emphasises what people are forbidden to do.

Duterte also used frame shifting by thanking the government of China for the offer of support: “But China, you know, President Xi Jinping, for all of his goodness to us, wrote me a letter and said that he is willing to help...He has said that they have managed the crisis very well in his country, and he is very much willing to help” (*Public Address of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte on the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)*, 2020). With the virus originating from Hubei, China³, and the negative sentiments of Filipino citizens against the Chinese government over territorial disputes, highlighting China’s offer of help in an important speech shifts the frame and presents China as a helpful ally of the Philippine government in controlling the virus.⁴

Conclusion

Despite the differences between Ardern and Duterte, there were similarities in how they defined the lockdown. Both referred to Italy as a symbol of a problematic situation which their countries should avoid. Both leaders presented the lockdown as a symbol of united action to minimise virus transmission. As for the differences, Ardern emphasised the urgency of the situation, which makes the lockdown the best option, while Duterte preferred to call it a crisis necessitating military and police support to ensure that people follow the rules for their own protection.

How the leaders define the lockdown is also context-specific. In the case of the Philippines, its history and the negative connotation of martial law required the president to use the dissociation approach to explain the difference between martial law and lockdown to allay fears of military rule.

The analysis reveals that while both leaders used rhetorical approaches to define the lockdown, they used them in different ways. Ardern used them to simplify the message and had a people-focused approach: providing a clear description of the lockdown experience for the people. Duterte’s use of rhetorical approaches was government-focused, telling the people to comply with the rules and what the military and police would do to

³ The first COVID-19 case in the Philippines was a Chinese national who travelled to the country (*Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in the Philippines*, 2020).

⁴ Duterte has always been vocal about his friendly relations with the Chinese government despite criticisms primarily due to the activities of the Chinese government in the disputed territory (Heydarian, 2017).

maintain stability and order. Further study is needed to know which of these approaches to defining the concept is more effective.

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Crisis and Change: Global Politics and Security in the Post-pandemic Era

Manqing Cheng

The pandemic will not bring globalisation to a halt, but it did expose its fragility in three main ways. First, the pandemic has boosted anti-globalisation ethos. The debt crisis and refugee crisis in Europe, and Brexit, have fomented the emergence and spread of populism in Europe (Conrad, 2020; Wang, 2021). Trump had promoted trade protectionism and withdrawn from many international agreements, which has also fuelled ongoing isolationism in the U.S (Dent, 2020; Dufour & Ducasse, 2020). This paper contends that the outbreak of COVID-19 has, to a great extent, increased the "adaptability" and "acceptance" of these anti-globalisation sentiments. Second, ethnic and racial tensions have worsened during the pandemic. Some in Europe and the U.S. continue to stigmatise and politicise the pandemic, forcing the issue of public health into an issue of ethnic conflict, which further undermines the already vulnerable foundation of trust between countries. Finally, the pandemic has further complicated non-traditional security issues such as climate, energy, and food. The economic crisis is the biggest by-product. Both the outbreak itself and prevention measures have disrupted the chain of food production and consumption, with a striking impact on small-scale farmers. The pandemic has also hampered global efforts to combat climate change.

The global pandemic will continue to have an impact, in reshaping production, social and economic wellbeing and the process of globalisation, in four ways, which I discuss below.

First, the global governance system could stagnate, disintegrate, or become reshaped.

The pandemic may further upset the course of reform for existing multilateral institutions. It was not until 26 March 2020 that the G20 Extraordinary Leaders' Summit on COVID-19 was held, whilst in May 2020, the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the matter of equitable representation on the Security Council postponed their meetings "until further notice". The inefficiency of existing multilateral governance mechanisms in dealing with the pandemic has crippled their authority and prestige. The pandemic has forced countries to focus on addressing economic and social issues at home, leading to a lack of leadership in policy coordination on global issues and a bottleneck in global governance. In the short run, the disruption of global supply, industrial and value chains caused by the pandemic could strengthen economic nationalism. Strategic autonomy - attempts to control the industrial and supply chains related to the national economy and people's livelihoods - will likely become the primary consideration for sovereign states. More countries could step up opposition to mass migration. Great power competition and strategic decoupling are likely to intensify. The inability of existing multilateral mechanisms to respond effectively to COVID-19 has aggravated the losses of the international community; however, it also allows for governments to be more aware of the necessity to accelerate the reform of multilateral institutions for global governance.

In the post-pandemic era, whether by their own strength or institutional requirements, more state and non-state actors would be prompted to participate more in the shaping and maintenance of the international order. Perhaps the cooperation model based on “values alliance” could hinder global governance, while in the face of global crisis and the defects of the existing global governance mechanism, relevant countries have been actively exploring new governance models and facilitating international cooperation founded on multilateralism. And this process could be intensified in the future. For example, China-ASEAN cooperation continues to deepen in an all-round way. Apart from economic and trade exchanges, China and some Southeast Asian countries including Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, have communicated on vaccine distribution, border opening and implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Lai, 2021; Walden, 2021). Another example is America's attempt to build multi-dimensional international coalitions on the strength of values. With the cooperation mechanism of NATO, Group of Seven and QUAD, the U.S. greatly expanded the content of cooperation and amplified its regional influence in the Western camp by inviting other countries to join it.

Second, regional integration could lead the way for a different form of globalisation.

The crisis has provided exogenous momentum for the enhancement of regional integration. Some countries that are geographically close, share a common history and culture, complement each other in natural endowment, population and resources, economic structure, science and technology, and are willing to cooperate in the broad sense of security, could actively carry out comprehensive integration to form a "regional community". This "regional community" of supranational cooperation is likely to become the fundamental unit of the future international system. Given the relative absence of global pandemic management, many regional organizations, under plurilateral frameworks, have used bilateral means to exchange information and strengthen multi-sectoral cooperation. For example, the Gulf Health Council has established a joint operations room to coordinate the regional response to the coronavirus. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation has pursued increased cooperation and created an emergency fund. Mercosur allocated funds to the project “Research, Education and Biotechnology applied to Health”. To avoid systemic risks, many countries have attached more importance to the agglomeration and autonomous controllability of supply chains, and regional integration from 2020 to 2021 was mostly highlighted in East Asia, Africa and North America. For instance, Trump signed the revised United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement to replace the original North American Free Trade Agreement in January 2020; fifteen countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in November 2020; and the African Continental Free Trade Area began in January 2021.

Although there might be no serious disruption in the global industrial supply and value chain and little serious setback in the international division of labour, the interaction between developed economies and emerging economies is likely to enter a new cycle. The signing of the RCEP shows that relevant countries want to strengthen economic cooperation and fight the pandemic and trade protectionism in a united and coordinated manner. But there will still be fierce competition within the RCEP and within the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership over rules and standards, intellectual property rights, new technological heights, and competitive advantage for future participation in global governance.

Third, the trend away from "single centre" and toward a "multicentre" or "decentralisation" may become consolidated in international politics.

The crisis is connected to a rapid change in the balance of power among major countries. As the effectiveness of COVID-19 countermeasures vary widely around the world, the extent to which countries are being harmed also varies. In the last round of globalisation, the U.S. was the global demand hub in the international economy, while a new round of globalisation is multi-centred with Europe, North America and Asia working with each other on a regional scale (Cheng, 2020). In the post-pandemic world, there could be more global and regional centres of economic globalisation. In such a strengthened multicentred structure, non-Western forces, including nation states, capital, and social organisations, could take a more active and comprehensive part in the process of globalisation. They are likely to project their own vision into the development process of globalisation which may move in a more balanced direction.

The liberal world order it dominates will surely continue to suffer from the legacy of the pandemic. The original structural contradictions between the traditional great powers and big emerging economies in the short term are unlikely to be effectively alleviated. And as more countries' utilitarian attitude towards multilateral mechanisms become increasingly conspicuous, traditional powers could further restrict emerging economies by means of rulemaking and agenda setting. Consequently, national rivalries embedded in global governance mechanisms will become more pronounced.

Perhaps the structural adjustment of the global economy and trade driven by COVID-19 comes from the internal impetus of business, technology, and society, yet the growing importance of "security thinking" over "economic thinking" is likely to lead to an increased risk of economic governance disorder and stumbling growth. For most countries, limited by their own production capacity and market size, the flexibility and resilience of their domestic supply chain is weaker than that of the global supply chain. So-called "self-sufficiency" cannot significantly enhance their ability to resist risks, but in a disguised way could increase the cost of production and result in hidden taxes for citizens. Meanwhile, in the case of insufficient information and lack of mutual trust, national policy consequences that are caused by the state's excessive concern about supply chain security could distort the normal supply relations between countries, resulting in an over-construction in some highly cyclical industries, which may further undermine the scale effect and specialization effect of division of labour. In addition, comprehensive or selective economic "decoupling" can also generate negative chain effects on other security fields, with a "decoupling paradox" emerging, whereby such actions have to be intensified to avoid the risk of decoupling.

Finally, any renewed forms of globalisation could develop iteratively, seeking a balance between economic development and national security, with the non-traditional security becoming prominent.

Climate change will continue to pose an increasingly pressing non-traditional security threat post-pandemic. In the report *United in Science 2021* compiled by the World Meteorological Organization, it is pointed out that the COVID-19 crisis offers only a short-term reduction in global emissions, which will not significantly reduce emissions by 2030 unless countries pursue an economic recovery that incorporates strong decarbonisation (WMO, 2021). Food, energy and commodity security continue to be affected by pandemic and political factors. According to the *Global Energy Review 2021*, international energy demand in 2021 was highly linked to global preparedness and economic recovery, with the third wave of the pandemic prolonging suppression on movement and subduing global energy demand rebound (IEA, 2021). By the end of 2020, at least 155 million people suffered from acute food insecurity, which was primarily driven by economic shocks emanating from the COVID-19 pandemic and the measures put in place to counter it (FAO, 2021). Digital security poses new challenges to all economies. In May 2021, an American oil pipeline system operator, Colonial Pipeline, whose computer networks were hit by a ransomware attack, was forced to shut down, causing seventeen states and Washington, D.C. to enter a state of emergency (Sanger et al., 2021). Modern supply chain and industrial control equipment are particularly vulnerable to new cyberattacks.

The concept of security order and the mode of security governance that adapt to the new situation could be renewed. In the post-pandemic era, for example, countries and regions will set about establishing more resilient public health security systems. The development of military technology and new forms of war are likely to greatly intensify the prevention and competition among countries in cyber, outer space, and artificial intelligence. The recovery of the world economy also calls for new driving forces. Big data, block chain and other high-tech means are accelerating the arrival of a new round of industrial revolution. This is bound to trigger a realignment of the power of the world's major economies. Overall, in the medium-to-long term, participation in global governance and provision of public goods will remain the mainstream foreign policies of big powers. The pandemic has revealed that economic development and people's livelihoods remain the basis for the national security of all countries. Without the resumption of work and production, it will be difficult to prevent and control the pandemic; and without global trade cooperation, it will be impossible to tackle the economic recession.

Conclusion

In the post-pandemic era, sovereign states will rebuild their relationships with each other and reconstruct the global market while seeking bolstering institutional arrangements. In view of this, careful judgment is required on the direction of changes in the global governance system and norms governing international relations, so as to formulate foreign policies that are in keeping with both global and national interests. Although the pandemic has highlighted many issues in the current international system, it is not the root cause of transforming uncertainties into actual risks, but rather the accelerator of the qualitative change process of these uncertainties. In the post-COVID-19 era, interwoven and mutually reinforcing drivers could exacerbate uncertainties in the international order as I have argued above.

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The Colour of Representation: Ethnic Minority Women in New Zealand's Political System

Rachel Simon-Kumar & Priya Kurian

The 2020 New Zealand General Election has been lauded – amongst its many historic landmarks – for the unprecedented diversity of its elected representatives (CNN, 2020; Curtin, 2020; RNZ, 2020). A record number of women, sexually diverse, and cultural minority candidates (including Māori, Pasifika and ethnic migrants) have entered parliament. Although less prominent in public debate, these elections were a particularly triumphant moment for women candidates from ethnic minority communities: a record 19 ethnic women stood as candidates across five major and minor parties, including a number of young ethnic women amongst them. Of these, seven elected representatives from three parties (Labour, National and Greens) entered the 53rd Parliament of New Zealand. Not only is this an increase from the five ethnic women parliamentarians of the 2017 government, but, in outstanding performances, two candidates, Vanushi Walters and Priyanca Radhakrishnan (both Labour), entered as electorate representatives. The last, and only, time an electorate was won by an ethnic/Asian woman in New Zealand was in 2008 when Pansy Wong won the Botany seat.

New Zealand's ethnic minority women's successes in parliamentary politics appear to be in step with trends seen in other western liberal democracies, where women from immigrant backgrounds are fast ascending to prominent leadership roles. US Vice-President Kamala Harris, Congresswomen Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Pramila Jaypal, Ayanna Pressley, and Rashida Tlaib of the US House of Representatives; Priti Patel, Home Secretary, and Dianne Abbott, former Shadow Home Secretary, in the UK, are amongst the examples of women from culturally diverse South Asian, Hispanic, Jamaican, Palestinian, refugee and/or Muslim backgrounds who have entered and are participating in traditional male, Eurocentric political systems.

A growing body of research points to the distinct political challenges that ethnic women politicians embody (Bird, 2016; Black, 2008; Brown, 2014; Krook & Nugent, 2015; Thrasher et al., 2013). They not only represent their parties' ideologies, but ethnic women politicians are also often wedged between gender/feminist interests and the identifications of their ethnic minority politics. They confront the adversarial nature of Westminster style politics as well as the discriminations of gender and race from men and women from the mainstream as well as their own communities (Amnesty, 2017; Ghahraman, 2020). In many ways ethnic women politicians occupy the position of 'marginalised among minorities'. For these reasons alone, ethnic women leaders deserve particular attention within political science and women's studies research.

These questions are particularly relevant in the New Zealand context. In 2019, the Marsden Grant funded a 3-year research project led by us to investigate ethnic women in contemporary New Zealand politics, entitled *Double jeopardy or double advantage? Ethnic women in New Zealand politics (EWP)*. The project examines issues of representation, symbolic politics, governance structures and styles, and the politics of identity and discrimination, that together offer insights into the nature of formal politics in New Zealand through the lived realities of ethnic women politicians.

In the lead up to the 2020 Elections, a two-part webinar series titled 'Meet the Ethnic Women Candidates' was organised on 29 and 30 September under the auspices of the EWP project. The first webinar, *Young, Millennial*

and Ethnic, featured four young ethnic women who were running for parliament for the first time - Rimu Bhooi (Green Party), Zahra Hussaini (Labour), Nuwanthie Samarakone (National), and Ciara Swords (TOP). The second, *An Established Race*, included four ethnic women who were seeking re-election to Parliament: Anne Degia-Pala (NZ First), Golriz Ghahraman (Green Party), Parmjeet Parmar (National), and Priyanca Radhakrishnan (Labour). The webinars explored questions about issues of identity, culture, aspirations, challenges, and feminist politics that shape ethnic women's presence in politics (EWP, 2020).

The conversations were rich and covered a wide array of themes. Although not all of them can be recounted here, a couple are worth highlighting, specifically, political party perspectives on ethnic women's participation in political leadership, and the question of how a notion of identity weaves itself in the practice of politics. On the first, there are sharply distinct views on how best to encourage ethnic women's participation as political candidates. Priyanca Radhakrishnan explained that increased representation of ethnic women in New Zealand's parliament was a priority for the Labour party, and for which they 'had a plan'. Labour's pathway to enhanced participation was not through quotas, but a focus on ensuring opportunities that allowed ethnic women to demonstrate their competence and merit without facing structural barriers of gender and ethnicity. In contrast, Parmjeet Parmar drew on her own personal experience of entering parliament through the National Party arguing that the focus had to be on the individual who needed to prove herself without expecting ethnicity or gender to act as barriers – hard work and merit would ensure success. The most explicit acknowledgement of the challenges that ethnic women faced came from Golriz Ghahraman (Green), who argued for a bottom-up strategy focused on equity and justice. These statements clearly reflect the distinct positions of the political parties on questions of ethnic women's advancement in the New Zealand political context, ranging from a gender/ethnicity-blind stand to one that recognises structural barriers that need to be overcome.

The discussions also touched on issues of cultural identity and, in particular, the part it plays in their everyday political lives in New Zealand. The candidates across the two webinars had strong cultural ties to their home countries; all except one were born overseas, having migrated to New Zealand as children or adults. For all of them, aspects of culture – either their nationality of origin, their ethnic group, or religious identities – strongly defined them as individuals, if not as candidates. Although their cultural heritage influenced their current politics, this link was oftentimes unpredictable, and even, fraught. Across parties and age groups, the candidates did not see themselves as representing solely 'ethnic communities' or 'ethnic women'; yet, several acknowledged that they would canvass the ethnic vote for the elections. There were exceptions, however. For Ciara Swords, TOP's political agenda aimed primarily at reducing structural inequality meant that the ethnic vote was not explicitly a focus of her campaign. Zahra Hussaini from Labour, on the other hand, explained that the 2019 terror event in Christchurch had unified the community across races/ethnicities and there was a recognisable effort to embrace diversity. This meant that Hussaini was able to step outside a narrow ethnicity-centred political agenda and instead canvass for herself more broadly as a Cantabrian. Priyanca Radhakrishnan, on the other hand, pointed out that while representing ethnic communities was a salient aspect expected of being an ethnic (and woman) candidate, the very heterogeneity of the community meant that it was not possible to be 'all things to everyone'.

The election campaign unequivocally highlighted the large talent pool of leadership, young and established, among ethnic and migrant women in New Zealand. Their presence in politics, whether in government or outside, is indeed exciting. All eyes – including that of the EWP project - are on the functional impacts of a diverse parliament and the extent to which diversity translates into substantive outcomes, beyond representation.

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First Criminal Extradition Case from New Zealand to China—a Political Perspective

Mengdi Zhang

Kyung Yup Kim is a Korean-born New Zealand permanent resident. The request for Kim's extradition is the first China has asked of New Zealand. Observers have alleged that New Zealand's government may allow the extradition and even further extradition treaty negotiations because of political pressure from China (McClure, 2021). This article argues that the political relations between the two countries would neither influence the decision to extradite Kim, nor the course of the completion of an extradition treaty between New Zealand and China. Domestic factors may also influence the extradition decisions and arrangements given the asymmetric relationship between New Zealand and China.

The Crime and the Extradition Case

Chinese authorities allege that Kim murdered a 20-year-old woman, Peiyun Chen, on his visit to Shanghai in December 2009. Subsequently, in May 2011, China requested the extradition of Kim under a charge of "intentional homicide", and New Zealand authorities arrested Kim on behalf of China in June 2011. Kim's New Zealand lawyers, however, are concerned about the possibility of torture and of an unfair trial if he were extradited to China.

After two years, the District Court determined that Kim was eligible to be surrendered to China in 2013 (The Supreme Court of New Zealand, 2021a). In November 2015, the Ministry of Justice decided to extradite Kim after the then Minister of Justice, Amy Adams, sought diplomatic assurances about his treatment. Following the decision, Kim sued the Ministry of Justice on 1 July 2016 and successfully challenged its decision. In June 2019, the Court of Appeal quashed the Minister's decision due to the risk of torture and of Kim not receiving a fair trial. The Minister appealed soon after this ruling. The Supreme Court of New Zealand released a 150-page ruling on 4 June 2021, deciding not to make a final ruling on extradition and adjourning the appeal until new assurances and submissions were filed on 30 July 2021. Kim was in prison from 2011 to 2016 and is now on electronically monitored bail.

Why would New Zealand Authorities Assist China?

Normally, extradition is executed according to an extradition treaty between countries. However, New Zealand does not have an extradition treaty with mainland China.¹ The only bilateral regulation of criminal matters between China and New Zealand is the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Regulations 2007. However, the 2007 Regulations do not apply to the extradition of any person according to Article 1. New Zealand and China have ratified two United Nations' conventions² that suggest legal assistance in criminal matters is a

¹ The extradition treaty between New Zealand and Hong Kong has been suspended since July 2020 because the Chinese government passed the new National Security Law.

² They are United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocols Thereto, and the United Nation Convention against Corruption.

widely accepted obligation internationally. In addition, according to Section 12 of the New Zealand Extradition Act 1999, New Zealand has an obligation to assist China in extradition cases. However, the enforcement relies heavily on the cooperation between governmental departments of the two countries. This cooperation, to a large extent, depends on political relations.

Political cooperation can be seen in the process of approving China's request for extradition. Under the Extradition Act 1999, the Ministry of Justice has the final discretion in approving an extradition request. Article 47 of the Extradition Law of China stipulates that extradition requests should be made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China to its counterpart in New Zealand. These processes of initiating and operating an extradition request suggest that the diplomatic relationship is an important component of criminal assistance. After the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China asked New Zealand authorities to arrest Kim, Judge Broadmore issued a warrant for the arrest of Kim on the request of Adams in June 2011 (Supreme Court of New Zealand, 2012). Adams' request in 2011 and her decisions to surrender Kim were made under New Zealand law. But this also represented a high level of political cooperation between New Zealand and China, because the foreign affairs departments in the two countries dealt with diplomatic assurances and engaged in legal dialogues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2016).

Are Political Relations and Extradition Decisions Connected?

This question originates from concerns that New Zealand's government has been under pressure from China to make a decision to extradite Kim, as New Zealand relies on China economically (McClure, 2021; Vance, 2014). These concerns presume that China would convert economic strength into political power, and this political pressure would influence New Zealand's extradition decision and future arrangements with China. The question is: would political pressure resulting from trade reliance influence New Zealand's extradition decision and its future extradition arrangements with China?

The development of political relations can sometimes guarantee an effective extradition process. For example, between 2011, when China requested the extradition, and 2015, when the Ministry of Justice first approved the surrender of Kim, the political relationship between New Zealand and China was developing. Prime Minister John Key visited China in 2013 and 2014, and Chinese President Xi visited New Zealand in 2014. It was reported that during Key's visit to China in 2014, extradition for non-financial crimes was mentioned in talks between President Xi and Prime Minister Key (RNZ, 2014). Foreign Minister Murray McCully visited China in 2015 and extradition issues were mentioned in the meeting with his Chinese counterpart (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2015). Minister Adam's first decision to extradite Kim has been connected with these diplomatic visits (Vance, 2014).

In a similar vein, Prime Minister Key's 2016 visit to China shows the linkage between political factors and the New Zealand government's will to negotiate an extradition treaty with China. As of 2021, only nine OECD countries have ratified an extradition treaty with China. Other developed countries, especially common law countries, have not ratified treaties with China due to concerns about China's unfair trials and human rights conditions.³ Surprisingly, Key said he was not "opposed to entering an extradition treaty with China" in 2016 (Leslie, 2016). At the time, Key was pursuing an upgraded Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China. Meanwhile, China was seeking extradition treaties with developed countries. Thus, Key's commitment to have an extradition treaty has been interpreted as a result of pressure from China in return for progressing the FTA

³ They are France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Lithuania, Mexico, Chile, and Korea. According to Treaty Database of People's Republic of China, http://treaty.mfa.gov.cn/web/list.jsp?nPageIndex=1&keywords=%E5%BC%95%E6%B8%A1&chnltype_c=all.

upgrade (Greenfield, 2016). Political factors seem to have influenced the extradition decision and the will of the Key government to negotiate an extradition treaty with China.

However, I argue that New Zealand's domestic factors have also influenced the final decision in this extradition case, and may be even more influential than political relations. Political decisions and legal considerations take different accounts of the situation of human rights in requesting countries (High & Geddis, 2021). In New Zealand's legal system, the situation should "equally be considered after assurances have been received" (The Supreme Court of New Zealand, 2021b). This legal consideration would not be decided by political pressure but by judges' evaluation of the situation of human rights and the requesting country's legal system. This difference suggests that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the judicial system in New Zealand play differing roles in extradition cases. The distinct roles also apply to Kim's case and any cases involving China. Furthermore, according to the New Zealand Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992, the Attorney-General will scrutinise extradition requests of New Zealand. In this way, the role of the Attorney-General and the involvement of the courts offer "a second line of defence" (Douglas, 2019).

Similarly, concerns in New Zealand society about human rights in China are also influential in deciding extradition requests from China and future arrangements. New Zealand's courts consider the risk of torture and the assurance of fair trials when deciding to surrender citizens, regardless of the country. Public concerns about human rights situations are related to the value system by which New Zealand's courts and the Minister of Justice evaluate the situation in a requesting country. For example, after the 2021 ruling, two Members of Parliament who are Co-Chairs of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance wrote to the Minister of Justice arguing against the extradition (Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, 2021). Public concerns and the political influence of advocacy groups may also adversely impact the ratification of an extradition treaty. One example is the Treaty on Extradition between Australia and China which was concluded in 2007 but failed to pass the vote in Australia's parliament because of the concerns of the use of the death penalty in China. The treaty would possibly fail to pass in New Zealand because of similar concerns.

Those who suggest political pressure from China would influence the extradition decision and future arrangements ignore domestic factors and particularly underestimate the role of New Zealand's judicial system. In addition, such opinions ignore the stance of the New Zealand government on human rights. New Zealand has a consistent policy on China's human rights issues and New Zealand's statements on Hong Kong's autonomy and freedom and human rights in Xinjiang have shown this consistency (Small, 2021). It does not appear that New Zealand will change its stance on human rights issues when negotiating an extradition treaty with China. Meanwhile, it is likely that the New Zealand government would face considerable domestic pressure if it began negotiating an extradition treaty with China, despite its assurances.

The extradition case of Kim reveals a degree of political cooperation even though New Zealand and China have not signed an extradition treaty. However, the final ruling in this case cannot simply be influenced by diplomatic relations, although a developing diplomatic relationship might increase the efficiency of the process. Similarly, it is unlikely that New Zealand will complete an extradition treaty with China soon. This is because New Zealand's judicial system and domestic pressure also influence extradition decisions, and the government's decision to negotiate an extradition treaty with China. Thus, the Kim case highlights the complexity of dynamics between political relations, domestic factors and extradition decisions, and the need for scholars and analysts to consider the way that domestic factors shape and influence government's decisions in extradition cases (Lipkowitz, 2019; Magnuson, 2012).

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Migrant and Ethnic Women's Perspectives on COVID-19 in Aotearoa New Zealand: Employment, Wellbeing and Resilience

Barbara Bedeschi-Lewando, Gauri Nandedkar, Sylvia Lima, Shirin Brown, Ema Tagicakibau, Ann Afadama & Randolph Hollingsworth

Background

With 10 years to go until the deadline to achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) is reversing decades of progress particularly on gender equality (SDG 5), decent work and economic growth (SDG 8), and reducing inequalities (SDG 10) in countries around the globe (Moyer & Hedden, 2020; Solberg & Akufo Addo, 2020). 'Women have faced increased domestic violence, unpaid and underpaid care work is increasingly and disproportionately falling on the shoulders of women and girls, impacting educational and income opportunities and health' (United Nations, 2021, p.2). In Bigio et al. (2021), researchers and practitioners emphasise that this population deserves the attention of policy makers, governments, and corporate leaders.

In New Zealand, the impact of COVID-19 on women has exacerbated the scope of both social and economic gender inequality. Research has shown that Pasifika and Māori women experience pre-existing inequalities and violence at work and at home, and the pandemic lockdown conditions and outbreaks have made women even more unsafe (Umbrella Wellbeing Ltd., 2021). Peterman and O'Donnell (2020) worry that victims are less able to report violence and seek help under lockdown conditions; for example, children have less access to education or other service personnel trained to observe signs of violence and needs. Data gathered in late 2020 shared by Statistics NZ shows a disproportionate fall in the number of employed women.

The aim of this pilot project is to explore the socio-economic and political implications of the coronavirus on migrant and ethnic women in Aotearoa New Zealand and understand how these women deal with the amplified challenges they face due to COVID-19.

Why

New Zealand registered a national gender pay gap of 9.2 percent in 2019 with Māori, Pacific and migrant and ethnic women facing even greater disparities (New Zealand Government, 2019). Women do more work in lower-paid jobs and make up 71.3 per cent of part-time workers in New Zealand. Even before the pandemic, women were significantly engaged in more unpaid work than men (Ministry for Women, 2020), including the double burden faced at home by women with caregiver responsibilities. These existing inequalities fall disproportionately on women, who are more prone to economic hardship and may be less resilient to coronavirus' economic impacts.

Methodology

Facilitated online conversations took place in November/December 2020 on the challenges faced by migrant and ethnic women and how coronavirus responses in the country have exacerbated those challenges. The discussions were facilitated by a member of the research team. The platform provided a safe environment for sharing experiences and an informal space for migrant and ethnic women to express their views. All participants were purposively selected. Notably, the online conversations served as the pilot stage of the study, hence, ethical approval was not sought. However, participants received an invite detailing an overview of the study and a consent statement, prior to the forum.

The three questions asked in the moderated discussion were:

- 1) Explain one of the biggest challenges you have faced as a migrant in NZ.
- 2) How were these challenges worsened by COVID-19 responses?
- 3) How can migrant and ethnic women contribute to the (policy) responses to COVID-19?

Content analysis was used to examine any trends emerging from the conversations. The researchers transcribed the conversations, coded the transcripts, and categorised similar phrases under related themes preserving participants' responses (see Berg, 2004, p.267).

Preliminary Findings

Most participants in the online forum were connected to academia, either as PhD students, former students, or current development practitioners/consultants. Much of the discussion, therefore, was focussed on three aspects of the participants' lives: 1) potential employment and livelihoods, 2) mental health and wellbeing, and 3) seeking opportunities, recognising agency and creating voice despite challenges due to COVID-19. Other subcategories of interest that emerged from the research were 1) age, 2) ethnicity/accents, and 3) geographic mobility. To protect their privacy, each participant was assigned an alphanumeric code.

Potential Employment

Most participants were interested in continuing or finding employment either during their PhD studies or after completion of academic theses. Through the discussion it was apparent that the task of finding and retaining employment was difficult for many of the forum participants. One participant (P2) noted, '*the biggest challenge I faced when COVID-19 struck earlier this year was limited employment opportunity.*' This was echoed by another participant (P1) who was concerned with the economic effects of COVID-19 and lockdown on migrants, in particular the rates of unemployment for PhD students:

"I want to find a job. We see the government protecting the jobs of Kiwis. [What about] the untapped skills of migrants, is it going to go to waste? That is one of my worries that I'm not going to have a chance [to find employment], because Kiwis will be [...] the priority of the government and the employers."

Another aspect to finding and securing employment mentioned by participants was a sense of discrimination either due to an audible non-English speaking accent or age. As one participant recalled, '*I try to find jobs, and I [can't]. Maybe having an accent and not being Kiwi plays a significant role*' (P1). A similar comment was noted by another participant who said, '*my accent specifically is very strong*' (P4). This participant was referring specifically to something she termed 'silent discrimination' in which the lack of information about

migrant lives and their work experiences outside of New Zealand meant neither they nor their work experiences elsewhere were valued, and therefore, not worthy of skills transfer to the New Zealand context.

Interestingly, one of the participants (P1) who mentioned her accent as a possible reason for the difficulties in gaining employment noted that her age might be a factor as well. She said, for example, *‘being older meant I was the odd one [out] with my peers, who are PhD students that were much younger than me’* (P1). This same sentiment was echoed by another participant (P2) who commented on similarities regarding her age.

“I felt that, as a new PhD graduate, I should get a job, but as (...) said, I am also older in a sense by age but [nonetheless] a new PhD graduate.... There were many interviews, but "we regret we regret" at the end” (P2).

Mental Health and Wellbeing

Most participants noted that the lack of job opportunities, compounded by age in some instances, were causing mental health issues. One participant noted that it is difficult for migrant women to return to their home countries at this time – due to border closures, lack of funds, or other obstacles. For example, P3 commented:

“Many migrant women separated from their families continuously struggle with the dilemma of whether to stay on in New Zealand or go back home because if they [...] stay in New Zealand, there is no hope of reuniting with their families. Hence many women in this category struggle with hidden psychological and mental health problems” (P3).

Similarly, another participant commented about the nature of New Zealand’s border closure and the effect on some migrants’ mental health. She said:

“the issue of the border closure began to take on a whole new meaning for me. What is beyond the border and [...] the shutdown?” (P2).

This was a clear issue for the participants as they continued to discuss issues of home, belonging, and what a potential return to countries of origin might mean.

“I want to emphasise that most migrants, including those on temporary visas, have no home to return to; that is the reality on the ground. It is really easy to say, “Oh, yes, if they do not get a job, they can go back home,” but is there a home? Now, COVID-19 has made life difficult for migrants, especially women. A lot of these women have lost jobs, and they cannot get [new] jobs. They cannot get access to benefits, and they cannot go back home. So, what is the way forward?” (P3).

Border closures and a lockdown affected migrants living in New Zealand at the time the government closed the country’s borders to all non-New Zealanders and only New Zealand citizens and permanent residents were allowed entry into the country. This had implications for migrants living in New Zealand as one participant made clear:

“Being here in good faith trying to create a life in a country that says we are welcoming migrants, and we need you to build up our country to suddenly being wrong-footed into the fact that a whole bunch of people holding New Zealand passports and are coming home. [...] They will have created a life elsewhere and then decide to come back home. So, the chances are that with COVID-19, they have come here (NZ) to stay. What does that mean for all the people who have been invited in good faith and are here?” (P6).

This points to levels of anxiety, feelings of isolation and desperation that have been exacerbated due to uncertainties in visa regimes, living in precarious circumstances and often being cut off from family and other social networks. Participants experienced ‘feeling like a ghost’ (P1), feelings of ‘isolation’ and ‘alienation’ (P2) and a general sense of mental anxiety due to the uncertainties that life with COVID-19 brought for them and their families – both in New Zealand and abroad.

Seeking Opportunities, Recognising Agency, Creating Voice

Although issues of (un)employment and mental health and wellbeing presented clear challenges for the participants, many found opportunities to address these challenges in a positive way. For instance, one participant’s optimism resulted in her refocusing her job search away from the advertised job market and into consultancy work.

“I see that adversity as an opportunity, so I would like to leave this session with optimism even though I could not get a job. I was able to start doing consultancy services and doing research. That has worked out for me. So yes, there is an opportunity in adversity [...]” (P2).

Another participant noted:

“I believe in [...] the strength of the people I see gravitating around New Zealand, and ethnic and migrant women, especially, have so many capabilities. I think there is an opportunity to participate, co-design and rebuild by [recognising] agency [in] migrant and ethnic women and creating a network of educated, strong, staunch migrant and ethnic women to propel this country [forward]. It has welcomed us, it is a wonderful country, it is our home [...]” (P4).

Despite a sense of isolation and other challenges, one participant commented that this is the time to remain steadfast and take strength from the fact that most migrants are risk-takers – and that is positive.

“One of the things I think everybody shares in this migration process or if you are already a migrant in your bubble is the sense of isolation, and COVID-19 really exacerbates that feeling. [However], being together and forming a network to share experiences strengthens everybody. We all, because of our history, share one thing, we are all risk-takers. We are courageous. We are not afraid; otherwise, we would not have made the journey” (P1).

Clearly, despite very real and often acute challenges faced by many migrant and ethnic women during a global pandemic, there is a positive thread running throughout the stories of the participants. Resilience, a willingness to adapt to new and ever-changing circumstances, and a sense of finding ways to contribute to New Zealand remain in the minds of the participants.

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Decolonising Feminism

Jemma Greenhill

One way in which misogynistic ideals and oppression have embedded themselves within society are through the colonisation of New Zealand. Despite the simplicity of blanketing the concept of mainstream feminism over women in New Zealand, it would be misleading not to recognise the difference between Pākehā feminism and Mana Wahine. Mātauranga Māori informs us that the ‘Mana Wahine theory is grounded upon and informed by Māori language, practices, protocol and knowledge forms’ and therefore cannot be directly compared to Western feminism as the term ‘feminism’ is not interchangeable between cultures (Pihama, 2020, p. 351). Therefore, this article analyses how Mana Wahine can be an important tool in decolonising Western feminism, as well as recognising the disparities between Māori and Pākehā women.

The theory of Mana Wahine aims to analyse the intersection of being both Māori and a woman and what those implications entail, alongside other complex issues (Simmonds, 2011). As a whole, Māori were forced into a Euro-centric society in which they were, and are, systemically disadvantaged. For instance, Māori women are faced with an additional set of institutionalised obstacles compared to non-Māori women. This is evident through the comparison of breast cancer inequities in Aotearoa (Lawrenson et al., 2016). The Ministry of Health provided evidence that Māori women have the highest rate of breast cancer in the world (Lawrenson et al., 2016). In addition to this, when comparing the survival rate of Māori and non-Māori women, wāhine Māori are 37% more likely to die from breast cancer (Gurney et al., 2020). If we set aside disparities between genetics, we can still find issue with the fact that eligible Māori women are not receiving mammograms at the rate of Pākehā (Lawrenson et al., 2016). Statistics from July 2004 to June 2006 show that 50% of Māori women who participate in the screening were diagnosed, compared to a 62.7% diagnostic rate for Pākehā women (Lawrenson et al., 2016). Furthermore, Māori women are comparably more likely to receive delayed treatment after the time of diagnosis (Lawrenson et al., 2016). This example shows how the health system continues to fail Māori women at a disproportionate rate and defines the need for Western feminism to be differentiated from Mana Wahine, as Pākehā experiences are not the same as Māori experiences.

Seeing as there are different obstacles for Pākehā and Māori women, it does not make sense to place Māori women into a movement that does not benefit them at the same rate as Pākehā. It can be argued that the catchphrase ‘feminism is for everyone’ is a tool for political gain. It fails to acknowledge the inequities between Māori and Pākehā women. It is tokenistic to bundle two separate issues under one label without giving rise to the unequal position different women are in. It could be raised that solidarity within a movement is more beneficial than separating two strands of feminism. However, this begs the question whether Pākehā women can aid Māori women in decolonising feminism. The implication of Pākehā support in this movement is the unconscious implementation of colonised and patriarchal ideas (Simmonds, 2011). This not only speaks to the pervasive and unrelenting permeation of patriarchy, but the idea that Māori need the right of self-determination and governance in issues exclusively affecting them.

In the fight to decolonise Western feminism in New Zealand, the Crown must honour their promises under Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Te Tiriti recognises that Māori have self-determination which extends to governing disparities between men and women (Reid & Robson, 2015). Realistically, the decolonisation of Western feminism can only begin when the Crown upholds equality and equity for all Māori in general. It is only when

Māori have self-determination that feminism can follow suit. An example of action being taken to check the Crown is seen within the submission of the Mana Wahine claim (Wai 2700) in 1993 to the Waitangi Tribunal (Johnston, 2005). The submission alleged that the Crown's inability to uphold the Treaty of Waitangi has led to Māori women being 'systematically discriminated against' and 'deprived of spiritual, cultural, social and economic wellbeing' (Johnston, 2005). In retaliation to the claim, Doug Kidd, former Minister of Māori Affairs, stated that Māori women were not regarded as having much status or respect at the hands of Māori men, rather than the Crown (Johnston, 2005). Not only did this statement encourage racist ideals, but was a blatant example of the Crown's inability to hold themselves accountable for issues they have created. The Wai 2700 claim aimed to hold the Crown responsible for breaches of partnership, active protection, participation, equity and redress (Te Rūnanga o Ngā Toa Āwhina, 2019). It included the inability of the Crown to protect wāhine Māori from 'experiencing acutely high levels of inequality in employment including pay disparity' (Te Rūnanga o Ngā Toa Āwhina, 2019). The recommendations sought from the claimant included obligations of active protection towards Māori women and Government engagement in consultation with Mana Wahine in policies regarding Mana Wahine (Te Rūnanga o Ngā Toa Āwhina, 2019). The hearing of Wai 2700 commenced on the 3rd of February 2021, however there is currently no outcome (Waitangi Tribunal, 2021). Wai 2700 is an exemplary model of how to decolonise feminism. By exposing Crown failures and holding them accountable, a focus is created to recognise Mana Wahine in a light different to Western feminism.

To conclude, the colonisation of New Zealand has been to the detriment of wāhine Māori and Pākehā women, albeit with disproportionate consequences. To put it simply, "Women have been a footnote in [a] male-defined system. And if women are the footnote, then Aboriginal women are the footnote to the footnote" (Grey, 2004, p. 9). It is important to note that the text refers to Australia, however it is still useful as a comparative tool. Ultimately, Mana Wahine can be used to not only inform the decolonisation of Western feminism but address the inequalities between women within New Zealand as exemplified in the breast cancer and Wai 2700 examples.

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NZPSA Māori

Undergraduate Prize Essay

Pay Disparity for Māori Nurses: A Mana Wahine Lens

Hanna Thompson

Mana Wahine theory is a Kaupapa Māori theoretical framework which centralises the experiences and perspectives of Māori women (Pihama, 2001). It seeks to restore their mana by reclaiming mātauranga wāhine and reasserting the mana of tupuna wāhine (Simmonds, 2011). The whakapapa of Mana Wahine originates with atua wāhine, informing the historical importance of Māori women to Māori society, and carrying through to Māori women's resistance of colonial patriarchal domination in the protest movements of the 1970s and 1980s (Yates-Smith, 1998; Pihama, 2001). This legacy of struggle informs the articulation of Mana Wahine today. In affirming Māori women's historical role as leaders, Mana Wahine demands a seat at the table for Māori women. Mana Wahine also fills a niche that antisexist or antiracist work alone cannot. Patriarchal and colonial oppression are intertwined, necessitating that struggle be wrought at their nexus (Pihama, 2001). In critiquing western feminism's attempt to universalise women's struggles, Mana Wahine also stands in solidarity with non-white women worldwide (Pihama, 2001). It is also worth noting its reclamation of wairua discourses not only invokes atua wāhine, but also addresses the spiritual "impoverishment" of western feminism (Smith & Taki, 1994). Lastly, Mana Wahine is a dynamic theory, building upon itself and evolving as contexts shift (Irwin, 1992).

Nurses working in Māori and iwi health care providers earn up to 25% less than those employed by District Health Boards (DHBs) (Waitangi Tribunal, 2019). This occurs even when they have the same qualifications, and in spite of international law (Te Apatu & Nuku, 2020). This is not a matter of unequal compensation for similar work, but of unequal compensation for more demanding work. Māori nurses serve a community which, due to the ongoing impacts of colonisation, have higher health needs than the general population (Waitangi Tribunal, 2019). Māori nurses are so poorly remunerated that many take up second jobs to feed their whānau (Waitangi Tribunal, 2019). This, combined with the emotional toll of working within underfunded and overstretched services, pushes nurses to leave for DHBs. High turnover subsequently further strains the Māori community health sector and its workers (Te Apatu & Nuku, 2020). A tension exists between nurses' material needs and their desire to help their communities using Māori health models. While the government alleges that its contractual relationship with iwi providers absolves it of responsibility, the Crown's funding model contributes to the issue (Te Apatu & Nuku, 2020). Moreover, the proliferation of contracts in state services emerged explicitly as a cost-cutting measure (Lovell, Kearns, & Prince, 2014). For 13 years, the Te Rūnanga o Aotearoa union (Te Rūnanga) have argued for pay parity with Crown agencies, at international forums, and

at the Waitangi Tribunal (Te Apatu & Nuku, 2020). The government should be ashamed of how it continues to ignore their mahi.

The rigid gender binary imposed at colonisation has served to undermine the mana of wāhine Māori working in feminised professions like nursing. Pre-colonisation, the relations between men and women were complementary rather than of subordination, and gender roles were not mutually exclusive (Simmonds, 2011). Colonisers foisted Victorian notions of gender on Māori, with women as “mothers, wives, nurturers” on the one hand, and men as “breadwinners, public figures, leaders” on the other (Pihama, 2001, p. 155). Such a binary implies that in her nurturing role, a nurse cannot be a leader. Mana Wahine exposes the ideology inherent to this construction through reclaiming Māori worldviews on gender, as the difference between the two creates space to interrogate adverse assumptions (Pihama, 2001). In emphasising mātauranga wāhine and the mana of tupuna wāhine, Mana Wahine contends that Māori women are authorities on their own experiences and needs. In organising to push for pay parity, Te Rūnanga directly challenge colonial gender roles, and demonstrate Mana Wahine in action.

Naomi Simmonds (2011, p. 17) has argued that “any Mana Wahine analysis is also an analysis of Tiriti rights”. The state has been instrumental in the marginalisation of Mana Wahine knowledges, and its policies necessitate deconstruction (Hutchings, 2002). The Waitangi Tribunal found the Crown breached its duty to “positively promote equity” (Waitangi Tribunal, 2019, p. 33). Considering Te Rūnanga have spent 13 years notifying Ministers of Health on pay disparity, successive governments have been aware of the issue and have chosen not to resolve it. The Crown also violated the principle of options, failing to “adequately protect the availability and viability of Kaupapa Māori models in the social sector” (Waitangi Tribunal, 2019, p. 35). As Māori nurses are disadvantaged working for iwi providers, that some opt to work for DHBs cannot be construed as a free choice. The Tribunal notes here, as well as in its discussion on partnership, the state’s obligation to properly resource Kaupapa Māori entities to enable their exercise of autonomy (Waitangi Tribunal, 2019). Due to the power imbalance between Māori and the Crown, it is the Crown’s responsibility to ensure it does not marginalise Māori (Waitangi Tribunal, 2019, p. 28). Simmonds (2011, p. 21) concurs that the reassertion of mana wāhine entails “deconstruction and critique of state policies.” Moreover, state funding can potentially act as a lever to empower Māori women, making its pursuit a useful endeavour (Irwin, 1990).

Pay disparity for Māori nurses invites an intersectional analysis. Nursing is an example of “care work” (England, Budig, & Folbre, 2002). It is not only a female dominated profession, but one whose labour is coded as feminine. Our patriarchal society devalues care work, viewing it as analogous to mothering and therefore tying it to the subjugation of the mother in the household (England, Budig, & Folbre, 2002). Capitalist economies depend on women’s labour in the domestic sphere to sustain the workforce, yet this labour is unpaid and often unappreciated (Fraser, 2017). This same thread emerges in nursing’s origins, where female nurses were subordinate to male doctors in hospitals (Kowalchuk, 2016). This essentialism obscures the high skill nursing requires, manifesting in low wages. Nurses have also raised that they are excluded from decisions concerning healthcare policy, similarly stemming from the marginalisation of the feminine (England, Budig, & Folbre, 2002). Race compounds this analysis. Mythos about Māori women have rationalised further devaluation of the care work performed by Māori nurses, while the rigid gender binary imposed by colonisation has amplified their struggle to command respect. Furthermore, in producing lower wages for Māori nurses, pay disparity becomes a class issue too. Mana Wahine’s critique of western feminism is particularly pertinent here, as western feminism cannot capture the intersection of gender, race and class which produce material hardship, emotional distress and spiritual distress in this instance. The nuances of how the devaluation of care work uniquely affects Māori women should not be omitted.

The solution for pay disparity for Māori nurses is simple: the state must listen to Māori nurses, and raise their pay. Doing so would advance mana motuhake, enabling Māori to govern their health care provision and bringing better outcomes for patients and workers alike.

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Research Briefs

Researching the Disasters we Live Through: How COVID-19 Shaped my PhD Journey

Heather Tribe

Initially, COVID-19 and travel restrictions interfered with my methodological and case study plans. My original PhD focus on the social impacts of climate events in Bougainville was impeded by an inability to conduct face-to-face interviews. Changing the location to Fiji and an online ethnographic study were considered as alternatives. However, other COVID-19 experiences sparked a greater introspective focus on disasters in Aotearoa.

I became motivated to make substantial changes to the crux of my PhD puzzle after witnessing the drastic shift in our food system first-hand during the lockdowns. Through my work with Fair Food, a Waitākere based food rescue charity, I observed an immense increase in calls for help with economic pressure amplifying existing levels of hunger and food insecurity. Ultimately, our operation grew by 35 times our usual in a matter of weeks, to levels that have barely decreased post-lockdown. Additionally, we saw an increase in many different forms of social vulnerability which subsequently added to the instability of individuals' circumstances and their need for food or financial assistance.

As a consequence of the travel bans and experiences of the sheer scale of disaster vulnerability in Aotearoa, it felt like a natural progression to change the topic matter of my PhD to exploring the gendered impacts of disasters in Aotearoa, thus allowing me to conduct face-to-face interviews whilst we are out of lockdowns. Additional to studying the impacts of COVID-19 in Waitākere, I am also looking at the Christchurch earthquakes. Combined, these two natural phenomena give us a good indication as to how our societal structures are affected by disasters. As we move into an era defined by climate variability and volatility, it is critical that we take an introspective approach to how we are affected by this and past disasters, in order to prepare for future disasters.

Workplace Experiences of Indoor Sex Workers in Aotearoa New Zealand

Peyton Bond

This project researches factors that impact the workplace experiences of indoor sex workers. It is a case study of sex work workplaces in Aotearoa New Zealand. The participants include 28 people with experience in indoor sex work, one agency manager, and one former brothel receptionist. Transcription and coding were both done in nVivo. While transcription and coding are now complete, analysis is still ongoing. Post-coding analysis and developing themes are presently divided into the following categories: workers' rights, wider labour market, workplace size/growth, tenure, role stress/fatigue, flexibility, outside commitments, and input/return. For example, community-driven organising speaks to a space with a unique form of workplace solidarity, borne of both historical and present stigmatisation, and is a significant portion of the workers' rights discussion. Within the wider labour market category, criticisms of said market revolve around the high input/low return of 'mainstream' industries, which highlight the sex work workplace as flexible and financially viable in contrast. That said, discussions around privilege cite characteristics (race, class, body size, education) that are more likely to secure a higher paying workplace and are named as exaggerations, rather than contrasts, of wider labour market phenomenon. The post-coding analysis process consists of reviewing coded interview data and organising the data into sections such as those discussed above.

‘How to Keep the Terrorists out’: The Politics and Language of New Zealand’s Counter-terrorism Discourse

Lydia Le Gros

On 15 March, 2019, a lone gunman fired indiscriminately at congregants as they gathered for prayer at the Linwood Islamic Centre and Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch. This tragic event was labelled by the media as New Zealand’s ‘loss of innocence’. In a parliament sitting four days later, Members of Parliament described the attack as ‘foreign’ and ‘imported’.

However, prior to the Christchurch terrorist attacks, there had been many incidents in New Zealand’s history that fall under the legal definition of terrorism. This begs the question, why are only some acts of violence seen as acts of terror? Further, what explains the selective use of the terrorism label by the New Zealand government?

In order to answer this question, my research looks at terrorism from the perspective of Critical Terrorism Studies, which looks beyond the legal definition of terrorism to instead see the terrorism label as an act of securitisation. To understand the New Zealand government’s logic in applying this label, my research will first uncover New Zealand’s official counter-terrorism discourse: how the government officially recognises and understands terrorism. I do this by using Critical Discourse Analysis to identify the social discourses, dynamics and narratives underlying the government’s understanding of terrorism, as found in official interviews, parliamentary debates, policy papers, and legislation. This investigation reveals that New Zealand’s terrorism discourses construct threats in such a way that places identity and ideology at the fore when identifying terrorism, thereby securitising ‘cultural outsiders’ while normalising the violence of ‘cultural insiders’. My research will also consider the colonial logic and roots of New Zealand’s terrorism discourse, as well as its wider social repercussions.

This research is being completed as part of my Master of Arts in Peace and Conflict Studies, at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago.

Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand

7th Edition

Lara Greaves, Janine Hayward & Claire Timperley

The latest edition of the widely-used New Zealand politics textbook has just been published by Oxford University Press after a mammoth effort by the editing team and contributors. Professor Janine Hayward had edited the 6th edition (2015) after 5 editions led by retired Professor Raymond Miller, and invited Dr Lara Greaves and Dr Claire Timperley to the editing team for the latest (7th) edition.

The book contains 43 chapters spanning seven sections: political history and identity, political theory, the political system, political parties and elections, government and parliament, policymaking and public participation, and case studies of politics in action.

The three of us worked as a team through the trials and tribulations of COVID-19, with a lot of Zooms and a fair bit of juggling. The project got underway in late 2019, with many of the chapters due mid-2020. We had initially planned a workshop for the new contributors in Wellington for April 2020, but had to shift this to Zoom. Nevertheless, it turned into stimulating kōrero with a broad range of emerging talent, from the comfort of our own couches and offices.

In inviting contributors, we made efforts towards representing a wide range of viewpoints. Māori comprised 20% of the contributors and women 51%. A wide range of career stages are represented including a number of postgraduate students and early career researchers, all the way through to professors. We also drew contributions across sectors, including those working outside of academia, and made efforts to include authors from across the New Zealand universities.

The book launched at Vic Books, Wellington on 22nd of July and is now being used for teaching across universities. Versions include a hard copy, but also an e-book with a 6-month rental option. Royalties from the book will continue to fund NZPSA student prizes.

We would like to thank all of the authors for their efforts in such trying times.

Lawyers Beyond Borders: Advancing International Human Rights through Local Law and Courts

Maria Armoudian

Despite “never again,” the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the conventions meant to protect human rights, millions of people continue to be subjected to torture, slavery and mass killing. Most have no recourse or redress. *Lawyers Beyond Borders: Advancing International Human Rights through Local Law and Courts* (University of Michigan Press) explores how a small group of civil rights lawyers in the USA used the tools they had—civil litigation—to do what seemed impossible at the time—win lawsuits in American courts on behalf of foreign survivors of egregious abuses committed in foreign lands against their foreign perpetrators. Armed with aspirational ideas, creativity, and the audacity to try what seemed impossible at the time, their win started a movement that grew and expanded. Congress joined with a new law that its authors hoped would lead to other countries adopting similar measures. If all reasonable countries did so, thought the law’s main author, torturers and other human rights violators would have nowhere to hide and survivors could get some form of justice and restore their sense of agency. *Lawyers Beyond Borders* tracks the early decades of rights expansion in the USA, followed by the retreat, and then the turn abroad for new ways of finding justice for these survivors.

Lawyers Beyond Borders was published in September 2021.

A Second Sun: The Legacies of Nuclear Imperialisms across Oceania

Sylvia C Frain & Fiona Amundsen

Oceanic livelihoods and environments remain heavily impacted from fifty years of weapons testing and ongoing militarisation. Communities of nuclear-impacted regions across Australia, French Occupied Polynesia and Micronesia are calling for their truths to be communicated. The current generation of storytellers are using digital photo-filmic technologies to capture their families' lived realities of the legacies of nuclear imperialisms across Oceania. There is an urgency to research and develop ethical methods for visualising stories that promote transgenerational knowledge for nuclear justice. As Pākehā researchers working within this context of Indigenous-centred storytelling, this project begins with a settlers' responsibility methodology and seeks to establish a socio-ethical image of contemporary nuclear imperialisms that is reflective of the long-lasting realities of nuclear weapons testing. Accordingly, the central question of this project asks: how can experimental documentary methods and socio-ethical listening and witnessing make visible that which is invisible, meaning radiation and imperial ideologies, while contributing to nuclear justice?

Filmic methods of socio-ethical listening and witnessing are employed with a twofold focus. Firstly, we will contribute to scholarly discourse concerning Oceanic nuclear imperialisms by questioning New Zealand's dominant nuclear-free narratives, which are often whitewashed and commercialised. This contribution will increase knowledge about Oceanic regions that are often overlooked within New Zealand's Pasifika context, while also providing a reflexive platform to critique our country's role within nuclear weapons testing and the ongoing militarisation of Oceania. Secondly, we will explore how screen technology can be used to ethically communicate the histories of Indigenous Oceanic activism that emerged as a response to the political and environmental impact of nuclear testing. This project will develop research networks while strengthening cross-cultural collaborations in Aotearoa and across Oceania. Finally, we will develop a series of critical essays and filmic documentaries that explore Indigenous activism for political sovereignty and denuclearisation throughout Oceania.

Related Publications

- Amundsen, F. & Frain, S. (2020). The Politics of Invisibility: Visualizing Legacies of Nuclear Imperialisms. *The Journal of Transnational American Studies, Special Issue: Transnational Nuclear Imperialisms*, 11(2), 125–151.
- Frain, S. (2020). A Defence Democracy 'in' the United States: Gender and politics in the unincorporated territory of Guam. *Small States & Territories*, 3(2), 319–338.
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Māori and Non-Māori Perspectives on New Gene-editing Technologies in Aotearoa New Zealand: Implications for Policy

Priya Kurian

Over the last two years I have been working with colleagues on a project mapping the cultural values, beliefs, attitudes, and perspectives of Māori and non-Māori citizens/residents on genetic technologies in Aotearoa New Zealand (Kathlene et al., 2021). Recent developments in genetic technologies in the form of gene editing have led to a sharp divide in understandings of how these technologies should be regulated. Some argue that gene editing, which involves splicing DNA sequences to replace or amend undesirable sequences, should not be classified as genetic modification, as they do not view it as posing any risks. Others believe gene editing is still a form of genetic modification and, therefore, carries risks to people and the environment. There is a range of potential applications of gene editing, including human medical treatments, food production, conservation of native species of plants and animals, adapting plant and animal species to changing climatic conditions, and pest eradication. Yet, policy making on such new technologies is fraught, given that much remains unknown in terms of long-term impacts. In Aotearoa New Zealand, gene editing is currently viewed as a form of genetic modification and regulated as such.

We undertook a national survey among a stratified random sample of 830 respondents with an equal number of Māori and non-Māori participants. The survey covered people's awareness of specific gene-editing technologies, especially in relation to broader genetic modification, attitudes to different applications of such technologies, level of support for current legal frameworks on genetic work, and approaches to Māori values on providing guidance on the use, control, regulation, and commercialisation of gene editing. Analysis of the survey data provides some important insights, revealing both similarities and differences between Māori and non-Māori on certain applications. In particular, the analysis reveals the public's complex responses to genetic modification as well as gene-editing. The study highlights how recognizing a diversity of values on gene-editing technologies can help shape a robust policy design on the use and regulation of gene technologies in a variety of sectors and contexts.

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The Dynamics between Rival Transnational Normative Communities within the Sexual and Reproductive Normative Environment

Danella Glass

Recent events related to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) have had an immense impact on women around the world – the reinstatement and enlargement of the Mexico City Policy by the Trump administration, the formation of the SheDecides network, the outcome of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2467, and rollbacks of access to abortion services in Poland, Hungary, and more recently, Texas.

These developments are not outliers, but instead mark episodes of a continual conflict between two rival transnational normative communities (RTNCs) – the rights-based SRHR community and the traditional family community – which have emerged in relation to the issue of SRHR.

The conflict seen at both the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development and the 1995 Beijing Fourth World Women’s Conference between the rights-based women’s movement and the traditional family movement demonstrated a polarisation of values and positions regarding SRHR. Some have argued that this merely resulted in a short-lived polarisation of rival transnational advocacy networks (Symons & Altman, 2015). This assumption, however, is ill-considered when evidence points to the contrary. Rather than a de-escalation of conflict between the two groups, the friction has, instead, continued to the present day and can be better described as a “long polarisation”, whereby members of rival movements have consolidated relationships, values, beliefs, identity, and norms, consequently evolved into RTNCs, an under-researched topic in the constructivist literature.

My PhD research seeks to understand the dynamics that exist between these two rival transnational normative communities. In particular, I will analyse the ways in which these RTNCs attempt to undermine and delegitimise each other in order to strengthen their normative position. My analysis of these RTNCs is also important given it will also assess the impact that these RTNCs have had upon the content of the global SRHR normative environment.

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The New Zealand Social Media Study

Mona Krewel

How are politicians using social media to target, inform, interact with, mobilise and pursue voters in New Zealand? Are there examples in New Zealand of ‘fake news’ and other trends negatively affecting elections overseas?

The New Zealand Social Media Study (NZSMS), led by Dr Mona Krewel and Professor Jack Vowles analysed the most salient campaign topics, the dominant political actors in the parties’ campaigns, and their campaigning strategies on Facebook during the final four weeks of the 2020 election campaign. A special focus of the project has been the analysis of dirty campaign techniques, including negative campaigning, fake news, and half-truths.

More than 3,000 posts from the Labour Party, the National Party, New Zealand First, the Green Party, ACT, the Māori Party, TOP, Advance New Zealand/New Zealand Public Party, the New Conservatives, and their leaders have been scraped from Facebook, analysed, and fact-checked. During the campaign, each week, the latest findings from the NZSMS were published.

The NZSMS, which is also part of the “Digital Election Campaigning Worldwide” (DigiWorld) project, which comparatively analyses elections around the globe based on a shared codebook, will now be carried on under the leadership of Dr Mona Krewel as a permanent and ongoing study which continuously monitors the social media communication of parties and party leaders in New Zealand outside of narrower campaign times. Starting again in March 2022, the NZSMS will have a permanent core and collect longitudinal data on certain key variables over all waves of the study, as well as alternating topic modules based on what is present in the public discourse at the time. Results from the study in the future will be published monthly to keep the wider public informed about political communication on social media in Aotearoa.

FIIM: A Methodology for Institutional Gender Research

Oluwakemi Igiebor

Feminist institutionalism (FI) scholars working on gender and institutions have employed different methodological approaches and models to analyse formal and informal institutions (Thomson, 2018, 2019; Waylen, 2014). Since the understandings of masculinity and femininity differ regionally, the nature of these double binds and their implications for male and female representation also differ (Adams & Smrek, 2018). Replicating these tools to fit the Nigerian context (my case study) is almost impossible due to the prevalent patriarchal culture and gendered nature of academic institutions in Nigeria; hence, the need for a Feminist Institutionalism-Integrated Methodology (FIIM).

My idea of a FIIM is a form of methodological pluralism that integrates one or more feminist approaches with FI to investigate gendered institutional rules, norms, and practices. For my PhD research, I utilised FIIM in two ways. First, I integrated FI with the Feminist Policy Analysis Framework (FI-FPAF) to analyse gender equity policies. Second, I integrated FI with Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis (FI-FCDA) to analyse interview data.

FIIM revealed a great deal about how *resistance* to gender equity plays out formally and informally within universities. In particular, FI-FPAF revealed the implicit construction of gender and dynamics of unequal power relations embedded in policy documents. It provided insights into how formal policies are gendered, highlighting how gendered assumptions, micro-strategies of resistance, hidden reflections on power and male dominance are continually perpetuated in gender policy documents. FI-FCDA enriched the informal institutional analysis by illuminating the limits to institutional gender change in different institutional contexts (universities with gender policies and vice versa). It provided an improved understanding of the workings of gender, power relations and change within an informal institutional context. FIIM, therefore, offers a valuable means to analytically assess the state of play of gender relations in formal and informal institutions.

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Shadows of the Past: The Role of Persecution within the Self-identification of Young Assyrians in New Zealand and Australia

Nashie Shamoon

The Assyrian peoples (Assyrians) are an ethno-religious minority originating from the Middle East. Indigenous to modern-day Iraq, as peoples linked to the ancient Assyrian Empire and civilisation(s), Assyrians today are far removed from the grandeur of their ancestors' past. For over one hundred years, generations have been persecuted at the hands of governments and non-state actors due to their status as a Christian minority. This consistent persecution has culminated in the creation and/or furthering of the Assyrian diaspora. The majority of Assyrians now live in the West and call countries like the United States, Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand, 'home'.

The current Assyrian-focused literature has turned its attention to Assyrian history, persecution, mass-migration out of the Middle East, and life in the West. However, the gap within the literature is three-fold. First, it rarely and wholly considers the perspectives and opinions of young Assyrians. Second, there is a limited-to-no reflection on what persecution has specifically meant/means for Assyrians born and/or raised in the West, instead concentrating on older, often Middle East-born generations. Third, in exclusively centring on American- and European-Assyrians, communities in Oceania continue to be overlooked. My Master of Arts dissertation sought to remedy this.

I analysed the extent to which persecution has affected young New Zealand- and Australian-Assyrians' self-identification. To accomplish this, between July and September 2020, I conducted one focus group and five semi-structured interviews with eight participants aged between 20-25 in Wellington, Auckland, and Sydney. I found that, due to a disconnection from the Assyrian homeland, young Assyrians have begun to create a Westernised-Assyrian identity—one which is not tied to the traditional, persecution-fixated Assyrian identity framework. Now, while the Assyrian struggle is recognised and honoured, the younger generation is turning towards a more positive, secure life in the West.

Navigating The ‘Purple Zone’ – The Role of Private Secretaries in Ministers’ Offices in New Zealand

Rose Cole

Non-partisan support for ministers in executive government in New Zealand is an important area of study which to date has focussed primarily on senior public servants or heads of departments. One non-partisan role that has served ministers since the introduction of the Westminster model to this country has been neglected in scholarship: that of the private secretary in ministerial offices.

The objectives of this thesis are to gain an understanding of the key influences on the role of the private secretary in New Zealand. The research question asks: how is the role and the function of private secretaries affected by explicit and implicit arrangements with ministers and with the public service?

The interpretivist framework of beliefs, traditions and dilemmas is applied within this thesis, and expressed within three separate articles integrated into a single portfolio. The themes of the articles - core executive studies, public service bargains (PSBs), and politicisation theories – are lenses through which the experiences of private secretaries are examined. While each article focusses on a single theme, the narratives of the participants expose their beliefs, the traditions within which their beliefs sit, and the dilemmas experienced.

There are several contributions of this portfolio to scholarship. The beliefs and meanings that actors make from their experiences, the traditions that shape their beliefs, and the dilemmas confronted and resolved are central to understanding how one actor – the private secretary – contributes to executive governance.

The portfolio applies three discrete theories as heuristics in a novel way, and through the narratives of participants, identifies key theoretical elements that are linked through roles and relationships, coordination and contestability, and resource dependency and structure. A paradox between networks and structures that exists in core executive studies is only revealed through the experiences of these non-partisan actors, private secretaries.

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Creative

The Me Not Movement (Performance Script from Short and Sweet Theatre Festival 2019)

Shirin Brown

In a not-too-distant dystopian future, people live with the everyday effects of climate change. Women are joining the Me Not Movement and refusing to have children. What choice will one woman make?

Inside an office in 2040. Fade in Blade Runner style futuristic music. Kiera (25-35, female) comes in, covered in overalls and a mask which she starts taking off and hangs on the hook. Music fades out as she walks across the room. John walks in carrying an external drive. Fade out music.

Kiera: Sorry I'm late. There was a checkpoint on the subway.

John: Yeah, news came through there might be a new outbreak.

Kiera: Lucky my shots were up to date.

John: Yeah true. Hey, great job on the 8G campaign – the data just arrived through encrypted courier.

Kiera: Great

He gives it to Kiera, who connects it to her device and starts reading it.

Kiera: I didn't think we'd get them to publicly admit the damage that 8G's been causing.

John: Very clever strategising.

Kiera: Thanks.

John: [Pause] Which makes this next part even more difficult.

Kiera: Ah..... so you know I've signed the Me Not Manifesto?

John: Yes. I got a call from Homeland Safety. They were worried that someone in a government department had signed.

Kiera: It's my body. It's my *right* not to have children.

John: Yes... (*mildly*). But if *all* women choose not to have children, we have no future.

Kiera: The planet has no future if we carry on like we have been.

John: No-one thought we'd ever get rid of plastic. But now you can only find plastic boxes in antique shops – People do change.

Kiera: Very, very slowly.

John: I'm not sure what this has to do with the Me Not Movement?

Kiera: It's all part of the same thing. Telcos will stop radiating us with 8G, and Me Not women will stop having children. We're all doing our bit.

John: It's a bit radical don't you think?

Kiera: What is the point of bringing more people into the world if the planet no longer has any life sustaining capacity?

John: (*Irritated*). But women can't just collectively decide *not* to have children.

Kiera: If I give birth, I need to know that my child won't die of cancer before she reaches adulthood.

John: Ending of 8G will cut cancer rates.

Kiera: Yes, but [It won't end them].

John: (*Cuts her off*). We employed you on a *very* good contract. Fully funded fertility treatment – that's expensive and you couldn't get pregnant otherwise.

Kiera: I took this job because of the opportunity to make change. Not for the maternity benefits.

John: All I know is you got this job because you've been tested and you're fertile.

Kiera: So you're saying I got the job because I'm a breeder, not because of my skills?

John: We're giving you the opportunity to have a baby. Jan and I would love to be part of that.

Kiera: Jeez!

John: I'm really worried about you [*pause*]. You know you weren't the best person for the job. We took you as part of the *Babies for the Future* programme.

Kiera: Don't you think you should have asked me if I wanted to have a child before you built your targets around it?

John: You know we're not allowed to ask if you intend to have children. Not after the Ardern government twenty years ago. We can only offer the perks and hope for the best.

Kiera: Yes, I can see you're in a tricky situation.

John: This department needs to show greater productivity, or show how we're contributing to population increase (*pause, Kiera ignores him*). If a lot more women join the Me Not Movement, you know the state will legislate.

Kiera: Force me to have children?

John: I hear they're considering it.

Kiera: Take my free will away? The rule of law wouldn't allow it.

John: Laws are made by people, and they can change. Mankind won't put up with its own extinction.

Kiera: I'm not sure if you noticed the shift. The Inclusivity Coalition has been in power for eight years now. There are greater numbers of women than men in government. It's no longer a question of mankind, but humankind, and women are taking the lead in fixing up this mess.

John: Women want a future too.

Kiera: (*Cuts over him*). That's right, and there's no time for children as we build it.

John: You can't just blame it all on us.

Kiera: (*Cuts over him*). Unless and until we can see a reverse in the effects of climate change there will be no births.

John: You just can't challenge a natural process.

Kiera: What is natural about children dying before their parents?

John: We cannot allow ourselves to think about that.

Kiera: We can and... uh... we are. [*Pause*].

John: Innovation, mostly developed by men, incidentally, is leading to constant improvement. We're some way towards building an outpost on Mars from what they say.

Kiera: For the last 100 years they've been talking about getting to Mars. It still hasn't happened.

John: But it doesn't mean that it won't. Breakthroughs happen all the time.

Kiera: I don't want to live on Mars.

John: I think the idea would be for all the climate change refugees to evacuate to Mars.

Kiera: The earth would be a gated community?

John: If you put it like that.

Kiera: Well it certainly fits the lesson of civilisation - greater consumption by the haves at the expense of the have nots.

John: You worry too much. The government has stockpiled enough so we'll be fine.

Kiera: So if I've understood correctly, I should go on having children on the off chance that they'll survive, so that we can continue to maintain our current lifestyle for as long as is possible.

John: Yes. *[Pause]*. I'm not saying it's easy for anyone. You think I don't think about the fact I haven't got children. That my story is lost without anyone to pass it down to?

Kiera: No, you're right. I can see it's hard on everyone.

John: Look, I don't make the rules. I've been told to let you go.

Kiera: I see. You're firing me?

John: We are, *disassociating* from you, for a choice not made.

Kiera: And if I have a child?

John: We'd be *delighted* and all the perks still stand of course.

Kiera: There was a time when having children made working life more difficult, now having babies is key to keeping a job.

John: Hmm. Lots to think about. *[Looks at the timepiece in his glasses]*. Look, it's 9.30 now. I'll need your answer by 3.00.

John leaves. Kiera, bewildered, looks after him as he leaves. Then turns to the front and looks out at the audience. Hold 5 seconds (silence) cue music. REM chorus. "It's the end of the world as we know it X3 and I feel fine."

Fade out

Running time about 8 minutes.

Please contact Shirin at shirinlives@gmail.com for performance rights. See more about the performance at <http://shortandsweet.org.nz/auckland/theatre-2019>

Book Reviews

Coleman, J. (2020) *From Suffrage to a Seat in the House: A Path to Parliament for New Zealand Women*. Otago University Press, Dunedin, New Zealand.

Reviewed by Esme Hall

Reflecting on the 125th anniversary of women's suffrage in 2018, Jacinda Ardern said 'we have a history we can be proud of in Aotearoa' (Anderson, 2018). If only she had been able to read Jenny Coleman's *From Suffrage to a Seat in the House: The Path to Parliament for New Zealand Women* (2020). The book documents the little-known fact that, after women's suffrage in 1893, it was 40 years until a woman became an MP in New Zealand. Why did it take so long? Coleman highlights various reasons for the delay, drawing on parliamentary debates and contemporaneous newspapers as key sources. But the book is a history not a polemic and does not theorise a clear answer to that question. As a result, it is probably better suited to an academic, rather than popular, audience. Nonetheless, Coleman makes a vital contribution to New Zealand, particularly Pākehā, political history.

From Suffrage to a Seat in the House maintains a non-analytical tone, generally letting politicians, activists and events speak for themselves. It has two sections: the first details the lead-up to the Women's Parliamentary Rights Act 1919, and the second focuses on the campaigns of female candidates until Elizabeth McCombs entered Parliament in 1933. For a work of feminist history, female activists have less of a voice in the book's first section than the male politicians – though their voice is one of bigotry, filibustering, shirking responsibility, and complacency. Coleman shows how, between 1880 and 1893, women's parliamentary representation was a constant feature of suffrage debates and bills, but was ultimately 'sacrificed' to ensure moderates supported women getting the vote (p 44-45). Although male politicians 'bask[ed] in the achievement' of being the first country where women could vote, they failed to grant women parliamentary representation for another 24 years. Women's groups applied consistent pressure over this period, but their diverse agendas prevented them from mustering the same unified support for parliamentary rights as for the suffrage petition. Commentators commonly argued women needed to demand the right more vehemently, or prove themselves 'capable' (p 166, 153). By 1919, however, women's involvement in war, influenza, and public life made it increasingly difficult to silence their demands (p 169). Women gained entry to the Lower House of Parliament in 1919, but were still barred from the Upper House until 1941.

In 1919, New Zealand was already 'limping sadly in the rear' compared to other countries who already had female MPs (p 194). Yet, it would still be another 14 years before New Zealand had its own. The book's

second half more colourfully profiles the ‘petticoated candidates’ who fought for the title of ‘first female MP’. We meet the formidable lawyer Ellen Melville, who campaigned on every possible occasion between 1919 and 1933, contesting five general elections and one by-election (p 236). Coleman argues Melville ‘should have been the first woman to take a seat in the New Zealand Parliament,’ and New Zealanders’ failure to elect her demonstrates ‘entrenched conservatism and bias against women’s full participation in the political sphere’ (p 236). Coleman also draws some fascinating, and sometimes laughable, stories from the archives. She profiles, for instance, Margaret Young, who stood for the Labour Party in the Wellington Central electorate in 1928. Her candidacy came as a surprise to both Labour and her husband Tom who, upon reading of it ‘in the evening newspaper, immediately declared his loyalty to the official Labour candidate [not Margaret]’ (p 218). Alongside Young’s previous involvement and arrest in several strikes, her campaign was marred by the Singer Sewing Machine Company taking her to court for owing them money. At a meeting of around 100 women in Te Aro ‘pandemonium reigned’ and Young was heckled with cries of ‘sewing machines’ (p 225).

Despite the long wait, the story of New Zealand’s first female MP is not a triumphant one. In 1933, the Lyttelton electorate chose Elizabeth McCombs to represent them, replacing her husband who died while serving the same role. It was ‘openly acknowledged’ that a ‘sympathy vote’ contributed to her win, but she was also a prominent figure in Christchurch civic life (p 240). Coleman portrays McCombs as a ‘conscientious’, ‘independent think[ing]’ MP who was concerned to represent all women, not just Labour voting ones (p 266-267). But McCombs’ health was already poor and worsened while she served simultaneously as an MP and on the Christchurch City Council, the Hospital Board, Tramways and Domains Board and as President of Sumner Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (p 267). In 1935, she took leave one week after Parliament began and never returned. She died on 7 June 1935 aged 61 (p 269-270). New Zealand was then without a female MP until 1938, when Catherine Stewart was elected.

The historical, rather than polemical, approach of *From Suffrage to a Seat in the House* limits the insights that can be drawn from the experiences of Melville, Young and McCombs about the patriarchal nature of New Zealand Parliament. Similarly, the book lacks a thorough account of its colonial context. It primarily tells the stories of Pākehā women, but is framed as the story of New Zealand women. Prefacing the Pākehā feminist focus of the book, and the lack of wāhine Māori perspectives in the sources used, would have helped readers to contextualise its contributions. It would, perhaps, also have allowed Coleman to highlight research on the colonial nature of Parliament from mana wāhine perspectives when she made suggestions about further research throughout the book.¹

To conclude, *From Suffrage to a Seat in the House* describes the 40-year struggle for women to take a seat in the New Zealand Parliament. Although Coleman does not analyse the patriarchal, colonial roots of Parliament, her thorough research will aid researchers who are looking to do so. The book complicates the pride and patriotism usually tied to women’s suffrage in New Zealand. But it did, at least, make me grateful for the women who persevered to transform a reluctant institution, and to Coleman for making their story known.

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¹ For instance, Ani Mikaere’s *Colonising Myths - Māori Realities: He Rukuruku Whakaaro*, or Donna Awatere’s *Māori Sovereignty* both reflect on the Pākehā legal and constitutional systems, and highlight the very different struggles of wāhine Māori throughout the period.

Hill, D. (2020) Taking the Lead: How Jacinda Wowed the World. Picture Puffin, Auckland, New Zealand.

Reviewed by Lara Greaves

I initially bought “Taking the Lead: How Jacinda Ardern Wowed the World” as a souvenir of the Ardern era. I had a flash forward to 2050, where I would show students the book, similar to how we now show the Lange uranium quip, drunk Muldoon, or kōrero on Rātana's 4 gifts. However, when I read the book, I felt a different way about its possible use.

The book covers off the key events in Ardern's career and personal life: from her childhood in Murupara, through to travelling the world, Ardern and Gayford fishing together, through to the Christchurch terror attack, and Baby Neve visiting the UN. The illustrations are incredibly colourful, enthusiastic, and recognisable as the key events in Ardern's life.

As a parent who grew up in the 90s, something that has struck me is the lack of progress in representation in children's media. I simply thought that more of a mainstream shift would have occurred by the time that I was a parent, and fewer stories would centre men. This is the strength of books like Taking the Lead: the book centres the story of Ardern, and is inherently about a woman in a leadership role. It is also from New Zealand, rather than many similar books which are based on American figures.

The internet says the book is aimed at age 5-10. The text was a bit advanced for my 3-year old, but I found the pictures great for starting a conversation about who the Prime Minister is, what the Beehive is, the UN and so on. The writing itself focusses on documenting events and telling a story of compassion and persistence. The content is certainly much more uplifting than Kiwi-classic the Magpies, but not rhythmic and repetitive like the Magpies or Hairy MacLary.

A theme in the book is that Ardern faces barriers, but she just “gets on with things”. While this is a typical “Kiwi battler” trope, the book does lack any hints towards broader structural barriers. Similarly, such critical insight is not well reflected in the three biographies of Ardern to date, and probably more a by-product of Ardern's career stage. A children's book probably aims to be politically neutral and is probably not the place to get into Māori politics (maybe it is?), but an example here was the author praising Ardern as the leader who stayed the longest at Waitangi. Because the book was written pre-2020 (pre-COVID) it may be that it dates, whereas I notice the others in the series are about historical figures.

Similarly, the cloak Ardern wore to her meeting with the Queen and her headscarf when meeting grieving Muslim families were mislabelled “korowai” and “hijab” respectively, where “kahu huruhuru” and “headscarf”⁹ might fit better. It is important to be precise here or risk falling into the “White feminism” trap. However, the timeline at the end of the book does make explicit mention of Iriaka Rātana and mentions Black,

⁹ Although this one may be debatable, and relates to whether it should be called a hijab when it is a *non-Muslim* woman wearing the headscarf.

Aboriginal, and Pacific women's voting rights in a surprising level of detail, that I hadn't really seen before (even) in academic work!

The book ends on a quote from Ardern, "I'm a mother, not a superwoman", and carries the message that Ardern hopes that everyone – especially girls – can do things and go places. It then returns and ends on the "they just have to get on with it" theme. This made me feel a little emotional the first time I read it. While I can be critical of Ardern, the reality is that she is a deeply meaningful figure to a wide range of people, and will likely be thought of as a great leader in the decades to come.

In summary, child-free/-less "aunties", "uncles", and grandparents (or similar) can feel confident buying this for the child in their lives. Between the housing market and childcare costs¹⁰ many of us millennial parents are probably too broke to buy new books, and so would welcome additions like this to our collections.

¹⁰ I think we just need to "get on with it", right? Right?

Contact

Lara Greaves & Jennifer Curtin

lara.greaves@auckland.ac.nz

j.curtin@auckland.ac.nz

New Zealand Political Studies Association Te Kāhui Tātai Tōrangapū o Aotearoa

<https://nzpsa.co.nz/women-talking-politics>

admin@nzpsa.co.nz